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Abstract 
In many developing countries there has been a paradigm shift in forest conservation 
and management strategies, away from State-centred control towards community-
based schemes, with twin goals of fostering sustainable forest management and 
reducing poverty. In Burkina Faso, various policy reforms have been introduced 
and attempts have been made to devolve use and management rights to local 
communities since the 1980s. However, it remains questionable whether 
communities’ participation has yielded the intended improvements in livelihood 
and good governance. With the aims of providing a platform for developing 
strategies that promote sustainable forest management, the studies this thesis is based 
upon examined the participatory forest management program (PFM) in southern 
Burkina Faso in terms of people’s access to forest products, members’ participation, 
their perceptions of the program, and challenges associated with early stages of 
political decentralization. Quantitative and qualitative data were gathered through 
household surveys, focus group discussions and literature reviews. The results show 
that factors related to decision-making, forest conservation and economic benefits 
are the most important determinants of participation. Further, the determinants of 
access to forest resources differed among households, thus local management 
institutions need to take these variations into account to ensure that the livelihood 
needs of the poor are met. Despite the decentralization policy in force in the 
country since 1992, the State Forest Service is still heavily involved in the decision-
making process. This considerably limits the active participation of local people. 
The results also show that, to some extent, participation in forest management 
activities is influenced by gender, household size, land tenure status, marital status, 
and forest legislation and implementation of forest laws and regulations. The 
performance of the PFM groups was found to vary, depending on their proximity 
to roads and market. Members’ perceptions of the PFM seem to focus on their 
ability to generate income to support their livelihood, while less emphasis is placed 
on forest conservation.  To enhance the outcome of the forest management 
program, the following strategies could be considered: securing user rights and 
empowering forest users by promoting the direct involvement of vulnerable and 
marginalized groups (women and migrants), increasing participation incentives, and 
enforcing the decentralization measures after addressing the challenges to enhance 
good governance and ensure equitable benefit-sharing. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Background 
The world’s total forest area amounts to just over 4 billion hectares, 
equivalent to 31% of the total land area, and on average of 0.6 ha per capita 
(FAO, 2010). Eighty percent of these forests are publicly owned (FAO, 
2010) and thus primarily under central State government control. Forests 
have often been exploited improperly for various purposes and the rate of 
deforestation is alarmingly high, despite recent signs of slowing globally, 
especially in the tropics due to forest clearance by people and land 
conversion for uses such as agriculture and infrastructural development 
(FAO, 2010). The destruction of natural forests has profound effects on 
many poor rural families who are dependent on forest resources that are 
capable of supplementing their income, providing safety nets and thus 
enhancing their welfare (Angelsen & Wunder, 2003). The depletion of 
forest resources has also accelerated soil degradation, increased flooding, and 
overtaxed the land’s capacity to regenerate and sustain ecosystems (IPCC, 
2001). 
Deforestation is often attributed, to a large degree, to weak governance 
structures (Gregersen et al., 2004) and the inadequacy of the traditional State 
owned and run systems of forest management for sustaining the forest 
resource base against growing human and livestock population pressures and 
overall economic development of forest-fringe populations (Matta & 
Alavalapati, 2006). Forest management concerns not only the physical 
management of the forests. It also involves enforcement of forest laws and 
regulations, accompanied by forest research and education to identify   12
appropriate measures to sustain the forest’s biophysical structure 
(Bellefontaine et al., 2000). There is increasing awareness of the importance 
of institutional-organizational frameworks, comprising sets of rules, norms 
and actors related to the management of forest resources (Agrawal & Gibson, 
1999; Margerum, 1999; Kant & Berry, 2001; Adhikari et al., 2004). Hence, 
in recent decades there has been a major shift towards more decentralized 
and people-oriented forestry management regimes (Pulhin et al., 2007; Klein 
et al., 2007; Turyahabwe, & Banana, 2008) and significant progress has been 
made towards developing concordant forest policies, laws and national forest 
programs. Close to 75 % of the world’s forests are currently covered by a 
national forest program, i.e. a participatory process for the development and 
implementation of forest-related policies and international commitments at 
the national level (FAO, 2010). It is now being recognized that local 
communities need to be involved in establishing forest management systems. 
Governments are opening a number of opportunities for sustainable forest 
management and biodiversity conservation by decentralizing authority and 
responsibility for resource management in various parts of the world. 
1.2  Community forestry regimes 
In many countries, different terms are used to indicate the involvement of 
local communities in forest management. They include, inter alia: 
community forestry (CF), collaborative forest management (CFM), 
participatory forest management (PFM), decentralized forest management 
(DFM), community-based forest management (CBFM) and joint forest 
management (JFM) (Sarin, 1995; Grazia & Grazia, 1996; Leach et al., 1999; 
Colfer, 2005; Blomley & Ramadhani, 2006; Ribot et al., 2006; Tacconi, 
2007; Mutimukuru-Maravanyika, 2010) each of which tends to have a 
specific meaning and to be associated with particular projects or programs. 
Attempts to realize effective and meaningful involvement of local 
communities were first made in the Asia-Pacific region, in the form of 
various community-based forest management initiatives and the devolution 
of management responsibilities for some forestry activities to local 
government units in the Philippines, land and forest allocation programs in 
China, Laos and Vietnam, transfer of use rights to forest user groups in 
Nepal, Joint Forest Management programs in India, and privatization of 
forest plantations in New Zealand (Paul & Chakrabarti, 2011). 
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Although all the terms used refer to the involvement of local communities 
in forest management, the level of involvement can vary substantially from 
one form to the other. However, all involve interventions, based to varying 
extents on local people’s knowledge and wishes, but ‘legitimized and 
strengthened by government recognition’ (Ingles et al., 1999). The concept 
of community forestry emerged from recognition of the need for forms of 
forestry that are responsive to local needs, as opposed to State forestry, 
which is based on the notion that State agencies have unique capacity to 
manage the resources. Berkes (1997) stressed the importance of “trying to 
develop equitable partnerships, drawing upon the complementary strengths 
of forest departments and local users” in the co-management of forest 
resources. Initially, involvement of local people in forest management was 
referred to as social forestry (Fisher, 1995), in which local people were 
involved in small-scale activities as a means to improve their livelihoods 
(FAO, 1978; Fisher, 1995; Wiersum, 2004). The FAO (1978) defined 
community forestry broadly as any situation that intimately involves local 
people in forestry activity. Community forestry is also referred to as a 
common property management regime that is intended to achieve 
sustainability by linking local people’s social and economic interests with 
forest conservation (Taylor, 2000; Sikor, 2006). 
Community-based forestry has become a key element of government 
policies and programs aiming to foster sustainable forest management and 
reduce poverty during the past three decades in many developing countries 
(Polansky, 2003). In community-based forestry processes, local people are 
involved in diverse ways that are broadly encompassed by the term 
participatory forest management (Wily, 2003). According to the cited 
author, “community” in the context of participatory forest management 
refers to people living within or adjacent to the forest. Community-based 
forestry is believed to benefit all people living within and close to the forests 
by improving resource management and rural community livelihoods. 
However, it is more admired as a principle than it is understood and 
implemented in practice. Within the rural community some members may 
obtain benefits from forest exploitation while others (often the poor) are 
marginalized (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003). Further, there is ample 
evidence of community-based forest management resulting in “elite 
capture”, which refers to situations where more privileged members of 
communities dominate decision-making processes at the expense of other 
groups (Ribot, 2004; Saito-Jensen et al., 2010). Therefore, many scholars 
have questioned whether communities’ participation has yielded the   14
intended improvements in livelihood for the poor, democratic decision-
making and equity (Ribot, 2002a; Shackleton et al., 2002). 
Nevertheless, the social forestry programs implemented during the 1970s 
and 1980s in South and South East Asian countries did provide 
opportunities for forest department personnel in these countries to enter into 
dialogue with the local communities. Thus, they laid the foundations for 
new forest policies recognizing the importance of decentralization and the 
empowerment of local communities as fundamental instruments for the 
management and conservation of forest resources (Balooni & Inoue, 2007). 
Further notable changes in forest management occurred during the early 
1990s with the emergence of so-called Decentralized Forest Management 
(DFM). This is an alternative to centralized or State-regulated forest 
management, which transfers forest use and management rights to local 
communities. DFM has no single definition, broadly referring instead to the 
State's willingness to move away from the command and control approach 
to forest management. 
In India, the DFM movement gained momentum and was formally 
institutionalized as a Joint Forest Management once people's participation in 
forest protection and management had been incorporated into the new 
National Forest Policy of 1988 (Balooni & Inoue, 2007). Joint Forest 
Management (JFM) refers to the development of partnerships between 
fringe forest user groups and the Forest Department (FD) in the region based 
on mutual trust and jointly defined roles and responsibilities with regard to 
forest protection and development. Joint Forest Management (JFM) is 
considered to be a successful regime, currently in force in all the States of 
India, as it incorporates forest user groups in the decision-making process of 
forest management. Joint Forest Management Programs seek to develop 
partnerships between local community institutions and State forest 
departments to foster sustainable management and joint benefit sharing of 
public forest lands. The primary objective of JFM is to ensure sustainable use 
of forests to meet local needs equitably while ensuring environmental 
sustainability (Jayakumar et al., 2007). In JFM, the users (local communities) 
and the owner (Government) manage the resources and share costs equally, 
but it is difficult to generalize the JFM approach in the light of variations 
across the nation with respect to geography, resource base, socio-economic 
status, cultural diversity and pressures on forests. However, under the JFM 
program, residents of forest-fringe villages have been provided access to 
forest produce to meet their basic fodder, fuelwood and non-timber forest   15
product (NTFP) needs. In lieu of this, people are protecting and managing 
the forests in cooperation with the FD. 
Another form of change from State to community property is 
Collaborative Forest Management (CFM), a generic descriptor of a range of 
participatory approaches involving some form of co-management between 
government forest agencies and other stakeholders (Petheram et al., 2004). It 
is defined as a working partnership scheme between the key stakeholders 
(local beneficiaries, local government and central government) in the 
management of a given forest. This definition encompasses a variety of 
partnerships, in various tenure situations, and recognition of the need to 
manage complex social and institutional, as well as silvicultural, issues (Carter 
& Gronow, 2005). Collaborative approaches have arisen in both production 
and protected forests (Misra & Kant, 2004). In the conservation arena, Fisher 
(1995) and Hartanto et al. (2003) have proposed that collaborative 
management should be used as a generic term to describe resource 
management approaches that combine three elements: recognition of the 
legitimacy of the values of development and conservation, acceptance that 
development and conservation goals are not necessarily antagonistic, and 
commitment to engage local people in environmental management. 
In Nepal another model of devolution of power, named Community 
Forestry, emerged as a result of institutional failure that had led to the 
degradation of forests in the central hills (Kanel & Dahal, 2008). It is one of 
the most highly prioritized policies in the country, widely applied 
throughout the country. Advanced legislation and attitudinal changes in the 
field staff have made the program very dynamic. This is very popular and has 
gained high momentum. This ‘model’ is particularly associated with hill 
community forestry in Nepal, where experience over the last 25 years has 
been well documented (e.g. Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; Hobley & Malla, 
1996; Shrestha & Britt, 1998). Community forestry was seen as a rational 
response to the problem of managing tens of thousands of scattered forests in 
difficult terrain, many of which were degraded and of little national or 
commercial importance. Community forestry effectively reversed the earlier 
policy of nationalisation, which had led to widespread ‘open access’ and, in 
some areas, to the inequities of de facto private or feudal control. In this most 
notable example of devolution, community forestry is now entrenched in 
Nepal and the debate over its implementation has moved on to second-
generation issues, such as pro-poor benefit sharing.   16
In the Sub-Saharan African context, the origin of community forestry 
discourse can be traced to participatory natural resource management 
movements (Western & Wright, 1994). These movements began in the late 
1980s, encouraged by donor interests in conservation and more sustainable 
management of natural resources, and in community management as a 
means of achieving it. Advocates argued that bringing local people into the 
forest decision-making and management has a positive impact on the 
sustainability of this resource. They further argued that by using the 
sustainable use paradigm, participatory forest management strategies help to 
alleviate local poverty by enhancing the managerial capacity and skills of 
local people. The participatory forestry rhetoric was appealing to donors 
who co-opted it, making it one of the conditions for forest aid from rich 
developing countries. For governments lacking the resources to administer 
large and remote areas, community forestry had the added attraction that it 
could shift some of the costs of forest protection and management to 
communities, and has potential to reduce destructive actions of rural 
populations that have previously felt excluded from access to forest benefits 
(Arnold, 2001). The process varies from country to country, but usually 
involves contracts with community-level institutions that set out 
commitments (such as provision of labour for protection and planting) in 
return for rights and benefits (such as the right to harvest and sell forest 
produce, and exemptions from fees, royalties and licensing requirements). 
Experiences from different countries indicate that community-based forestry 
can encompass diverse sets of activities, providing different sets of rights and 
responsibilities to communities with varying understandings of who or what 
the communities consist of, and who represents them (Twyman, 2000; 
Matose & Watts, 2010). There is a need to ensure that each form of 
devolution of power to local communities leads to successful fulfilment of 
the commonly assigned twin goals of poverty alleviation and forest 
conservation. Therefore, there is a growing call to assess participatory 
forestry programs by addressing issues related to community members’ access 
to forest resources and decision-making processes, and the ability of the 
community-based forestry system to ensure members’ participation. 
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1.3  Rationale of the research underlying the thesis and problem 
analysis 
Historically, in many francophone West African countries, including 
Burkina Faso, much of the forest resource used to be controlled by 
traditional authorities, as part of broader systems of control of land and use 
of land. These systems became overlaid in the colonial and postcolonial 
periods with varying degrees of State tenure and control over forest and tree 
resources, and often over tree-bearing land. In a series of land-tenure laws 
enacted in 1825, 1848 and 1899, the French West African colonies claimed 
forests as State property, and the first forestry code, issued in 1900, 
confirmed colonial State control of forests (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). A more 
elaborate forestry code, passed on 4 July 1935 (République de Côte 
d’Ivoire, 1949), handed even more responsibility for the forests in the region 
to the French West African Forest Service. Under this decree, all or part of 
the land classified as forest was to be exempt from human use. Local 
communities were seen as a threat to the environment and the location of 
villages close to classified forests was discouraged (Foury, 1948). Due to the 
expansion of shifting cultivation in the 1930s, large parts of the North 
Sudanian zone of West Africa were delimited and protected by the colonial 
administration as wildlife sanctuaries, to prevent land use change (Sheperd, 
1992). After independence (in 1960), forest codes of the new State adopted 
the principles of the 1935 Decree, and established forests as properties of the 
State (Bertrand, 1991). 
Since the mid-1970s there has been a growing need to ensure that local 
people have access and rights to use the nearby forest, and that they are able 
to develop a sustainable relationship with them. During this period 
development strategies and practices moved towards a rural orientation 
(World Bank, 1978), accompanied by awareness of the need to help rural 
populations mobilise by devoting greater efforts to meeting their “basic 
needs”. Meanwhile, the woodfuel crisis (Eckholm, 1975) that followed the 
jump in fossil energy prices in 1973 and accelerated reductions of tree cover 
in Sahelian countries during and after the prolonged period of drought in 
the 1970s, drew more attention to the dependence of people on forests. 
These factors also raised awareness of the need to employ the knowledge of 
people living near the forests (through dialogue and collaboration) to 
maintain the vegetation cover. 
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In Burkina Faso, State forest reserves account for 25% of the total area of 
forests and woodlands, which cover 7.1 million ha (26%) of the country’s 
land area (Kaboré, 2004). The participatory forest management programs in 
West African countries, including Burkina Faso, are believed to originate 
from concerns arising from the fuelwood crisis and the failure of centralized 
forestry policies inherited from the colonial period (Amanor, 2004). To 
meet the fuelwood needs of the urban population and control 
desertification, large-scale plantation projects were initiated using exotic 
species, such as Eucalyptus camaldulensis Denh., Gmelina arborea Roxb. and 
Tectona grandis L. f. These projects were costly and unsuccessful because they 
failed to engage local people through dialogue and collaboration 
(Bellefontaine et al., 2000; Zida, 2007). Moreover, State policies and 
institutional strategies did not involve local people fully since they failed to 
offer them opportunities to enhance their livelihoods. Thus, to overcome 
these constraints it was necessary to develop new policies.  
From the 1980s, interest in natural forest management has increased, and 
participatory forest management (with wide responsibility and ownership 
assigned to the local population) has been implemented (Kaboré, 2004). In 
1986, a participatory forest management program was initiated by the 
Ministry of the Environment and Water with the support of a joint FAO 
and UNDP project (UNDP/FAO BKF), which strongly encourages 
involvement of local people (Delnooz, 1999; Ribot, 1999). The program 
has been implemented in areas within 150 km of Ouagadougou (the capital 
of Burkina Faso) with the aim of providing the city with fuelwood in a 
sustainable manner. Consequently, several forest management domains 
(FMDs) have been established throughout the country, inter alia the Sissili 
and Ziro provinces of southern Burkina Faso. In each FMD, several 
operational forest management units (FMUs) with areas ranging from 2 000 
to 4 000 ha have been established. The FMUs are managed by several forest 
management groups (FMGs) composed of villagers residing adjacent to the 
forests. Management agreements have been made between the villagers and 
the Forestry Service, and a management plan has been prepared to regulate 
wood extraction, and activities that foster ecosystem conservation and 
biodiversity protection. Following the introduction of the participatory 
forest management policy, from 1991 a decentralization process started in 
the country and in 1997 a new Forestry Code was enacted. The 
decentralized forest governance in the participatory forest management 
programs is intended to ensure communities’ rights of access to forests and 
engage them in sustainable forest management. The implementation of the   19
participatory forest management program in Burkina Faso has high 
importance since almost 90% of households in the country rely on fuelwood 
for their energy supply (Rouamba, 2003). Further, non-timber forest 
products (NWFP: fruits/kernel, gums, honey, etc.) are largely used for 
subsistence in the households and for national and international trade. For 
example, shea butter derived from Vitellaria paradoxa is reportedly the second 
most important export from Burkina Faso, after cotton (FAO, 2009). 
In Burkina Faso, as in most African countries, involving local communities 
in the management of forests is well underway. As a whole, issues of forest 
management are as much matters of technical management of biophysical 
aspects of the forest as a governance issue. In Burkina Faso, regulatory 
frameworks have been established to provide policy and legal support for 
management of the forests through National Forestry Policies, National 
Forest Management Plans and (particularly) the new forestry legislation 
noted above. All of these legal guidelines stress the importance of increasing 
local participation in forest management. However, while PFM programs 
have engendered significant interest and general awareness in forest 
management among rural communities in the project areas (Kaboré, 2004), 
it remained unclear, prior to the studies this thesis based upon, whether local 
people have effective control of the resource (Hagberg, 1998; Delnooz, 
1999). Nguiguiri (1999) emphasized the need for a better understanding of 
what works and does not work, and investigations of possible ways to 
improve and streamline the implementation of PFM. Hence, more research 
was needed to fully understand related issues, such as the following. 
a) Local peoples’ access to forest products, equity in rights and benefits from the 
forest resource. PFM should engage local communities as users and foster their 
cooperation by legalizing some of their forest access. However, residents of 
forest-fringe villages are not homogenous and households might have 
unequal access to forest products to meet their basic needs of fodder, 
fuelwood and NTFP. Thus, it is important to ascertain the attributes of 
individuals that influence their access to the forests in Sissili province for 
fuelwood collection, grazing livestock and extraction of NTFPs. What 
factors may constrain access to these products? 
b)  Local people’s participation. This has been a key issue for the PFM 
program; understanding factors that influence households’ participation in 
the forest management program may be crucial for forest managers and 
decision-makers. What makes people participate in the PFM program in   20
Burkina Faso? In particular, how does forest dependence (share of income 
from the forest) affect households' participation choices? Obtaining answers 
to these questions is vital for assessing local responses to devolution policies. 
They would provide indications of the appropriateness of devolution 
programs as pro-poor and forest-conserving strategies, and hence yield 
important insights for improving the programs. 
c)  Local people’s perception of the PFM. These perceptions have strong 
bearings on its adoption and sustainability. Therefore, identifying the reasons 
why individuals choose whether or not to participate in voluntary 
organizations may contribute to improvements in the PFM processes. If 
community members are to participate in a sustainable forest management 
program, they first need to believe that the practices are important, that they 
provide a safe rural environment, and that they will bring in a stable and 
long-term income. Therefore, measuring members’ perceptions and the 
performance of forest management groups, and understanding how factors 
such as the resource-base, group characteristics, knowledge of the 
environment and perceived benefits and losses influence their perceptions is 
essential for successful decentralization of forest management. 
d) The need for stronger and more legal institutional forms to entrench local roles. 
This is universally felt to enable formal divestment and the exercise of 
meaningful jurisdiction. In PFM, accountability, transparency, 
empowerment and equity are becoming pivotal, both to those with whom 
management agreements are signed and internally to make local forest 
managers accountable to the wider communities on whose behalf they act. 
In the process, institutional issues increasingly concern PFM developments 
and pose the most challenges to the development of effective and 
democratic norms of local level governance over forests.   21
2  Objectives 
The goals of the work this thesis is based upon were to examine the 
participatory forest management program in southern Burkina Faso in terms 
of people’s access to forest resources, members’ participation and their 
perception of the program, the challenges associated with early stages of 
administrative decentralization and forest management. Hence, the overall 
aim was to contribute to understanding of factors that foster the participation 
of local communities in co-management and provide a platform for the 
development of strategies that promote sustainable forest management. The 
specific objectives were to: 
 
1.  Identify and analyze the key determinants of access to the forest resource 
(Study I); 
2.  Identify and characterize factors that influence local people’s decisions to 
participate in forest management programs and ways in which the State 
Forest Service influences local people’s participation in the program 
(Study II); 
3.  Examine the variation in perceptions and performance of the 
participatory forest management groups among four FMUs and 
determine if this variation is attributable to the resource characteristics, 
group characteristics or proximity to the market (Study III); 
4.  Identify and analyze the issues and challenges to the implementation of 
the decentralization policy in forest management in Burkina Faso (Study 
IV). 
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3  Concepts and theoretical 
considerations  
In this research, theories and perspectives related to common-pool resources, 
property rights and access, collective action, participation and participatory 
approaches, and power relationships provided a theoretical base for 
examining the participatory forest management program process. Thus, a 
brief account of each of these aspects is presented below.  
3.1  Common-pool resources, property rights and collective 
action 
3.1.1  Common-pool resources 
Common-pool resources (CPRs) are defined as natural resources with size 
or characteristics that make it costly or difficult to exclude potential 
beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from their use, and one person’s use of 
them subtracts from its use by others (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1992; 
Dietz et al., 2002). Examples of CPRs are forests, ocean fisheries and 
grasslands. Knowledge of associated property rights is crucial for 
understanding socio-economic aspects of CPRs. A theory that has been 
widely applied in considerations of the management of CPRs is “the tragedy 
of the commons” Hardin (1968), which holds that CPR users are unable to 
self-organize to preserve their resources. This is due to the presumption that 
users of common resources become trapped in an inevitable commons 
dilemma and are unable to find solutions to avoid destruction of the 
resources they use. Consequently, Hardin recommended privatization or 
government control as alternatives for sustaining common resources over the 
long term. He perceived these options as being the only ways through   23
which uses and users of the CPRs could be regulated (Feeny et al., 1990). 
However, Berkes (2000), Dietz (2003) and Pretty (2003) subsequently 
disagreed, suggesting that factors such as strong local knowledge, practices 
and institutions can make communal management of common-pool 
resources sustainable over the long term. 
 
3.1.2   Property rights 
Property rights refer to the rights to use a resource (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1973). Fundamentally, there are two types of rights governing uses of 
common pool resources: customary rights and legal rights. For every right an 
individual holds, there are rules that authorize or require particular actions to 
be taken in exercising that property right (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Access 
is often referred to as a property right, but definitions of the terms vary. 
Access has been described as the right to enter and use CPRs such as forests 
(Schlager & Ostrom, 1992), but Ribot and Peluso (2003) define it as the 
ability to derive benefits from things (resources) and regard “property rights” 
as rights to benefit from a resource. 
Thus, for Ribot and Peluso, “access” refers to a bundle of powers while 
“property rights” represent a bundle of rights. Access as a bundle of powers 
underpins a wider range of social relationships that can constrain or allow an 
individual to benefit from a resource. For Sikor and Lund (2009), property 
is about claims that are considered legitimate. Physical access, in terms of 
accessibility/proximity of a resource, does not necessarily entail social access. 
An individual can have physical access to a resource without having social 
access to it. Thus, social access is a key determinant of the benefits different 
individuals obtain from resources (Mosse, 1997). For this reason forest 
wealth has not generally been equitably shared within rural communities; 
some groups, such as poor people (Neupane, 2003; Adhikari et al., 2004) 
and migrants or women in some cases (Nabanoga, 2005), have had limited 
access to forest resources. 
Feeny et al. (1990) have identified the following four categories of 
property right regimes: State property, private property, communal property 
and open access. Under State property right regimes ownership and 
management control of a resource are held by the State. In private property 
regimes the property rights are the prerogatives of individuals or 
corporations (Blomley, 1991). Under a communal (Feeny et al., 1990) or   24
“common property rights” regime, access is restricted to a specific group of 
resource users who hold their rights and duties in common (Ostrom, 1986; 
Bromley, 1991). Open access refers to situations where there are no well-
defined property rights related to resources, so access to them is unregulated 
and open to everyone (Feeny et al., 1990). Under an open-access regime, 
there is no defined group of users or owners. Further, users act 
independently and do not communicate or coordinate their activities in any 
way (Ostrom, 1999). The four types of arrangements are recognized to 
sometimes overlap; resulting in conflict situations (Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 
2001; Tachibana et al., 2001). As argued by Agrawal (2003) variations in 
forms of property rights are important since they can strongly influence the 
outcome of resource management. 
Common property resources share the following two important 
characteristics: excludability and subtractability. Excludability refers to the 
difficulty or impossibility of controlling access by potential users, due to the 
physical nature of the resources. It is assumed that it would be difficult or 
costly to exclude others from accessing the resource. Subtractability refers to 
the presumption that even if users cooperate to improve the productivity of 
the resources, exploitation by one user will adversely affect the ability of 
other users to exploit the resources due to the characteristic(s) of the 
resources (Feeny et al., 1990). The main criticism addressed to Hardin’s 
theory is that he did not consider the possibility of excluding people other 
than members of a defined community, under a communal property regime. 
Thus, Hardin’s perspectives implicitly deny the possibility of regulations 
arising regarding the use and users in a resource management system. 
Therefore, he has been criticized for considering communal property 
regimes to be like open access situations (Feeny et al., 1990). 
Scholars interested in common property have acknowledged the core role 
of common property rights for successful governance of a common-pool 
resource (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2001; Laerhoven & Ostrom, 2007). 
Subsequent analysts have acknowledged the core role of common property 
rights in successful governance of a common-pool resource (Ostrom, 1990; 
Agrawal, 2001; Laerhoven & Ostrom, 2007). Further, there is now wide 
recognition of the importance of a well-defined group of users for successful 
forest management (Dayton-Johnson, 2000; Gibson et al., 2000). Schlager 
and Ostrom (1992) suggest that the following legal rights must be held by 
the resource users under a community-based natural resource management 
regime: a) the right to use the resource (e.g. cut firewood), b) the right to   25
manage it (e.g. plant seedlings and maintain fire-breaks), c) the right to 
exclude (determine who else may use the resource) and d) the right to 
alienate (transfer user rights to others by inheritance, sale or gift). Such 
bundles of rights are associated with geographical and social positions that 
provide users rights to enter and use resource products (physical and social 
access). Authorized users have rights to enter, extract and manage the 
resources, while rights to enter, withdraw and manage the resource, and 
exclude those lacking user-rights, are granted to the proprietors. Owners 
possess full rights to enter, use and manage the resource, exclude non-
members from using the resource and sell (control) the rights over the 
resource (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). 
The participatory forest management program in Burkina Faso is a 
common property regime. Under this program, most of the forests are 
recognized as being State property, but the rights to manage them have been 
devolved to local communities living next to the forests, organized into 
forest management groups (FMGs). In addition, there are forests (located 
mainly in the buffer-zones of e.g. Sissili and Nazinga forests in Southern 
Burkina) that are managed by private individuals, mainly for wildlife 
conservation. A communal property regime is applied to some forests, such 
as some parklands dominated by tree species (e.g. parklands of Vitellaria 
paradoxa in Sissili province). There are also some forests for which access is 
unrestricted, access to them being open to anyone residing in adjacent 
villages. 
This thesis, and the underlying studies, focus on the State forests managed 
under the participatory management program with recognition of local 
population’s use rights. Use rights, management rights and the rights to 
exclude non-members from the use of some forest resources are recognized 
and allocated to the forest management group (FMG) members. Alienation 
rights are also granted to the user groups. The FMGs are based in the villages 
within the forest management areas (Forest Management Units). However, 
as acknowledged by previous authors (Lavigne-Delville, 2000; McCarthy, 
2005), in the developing countries customary rights are sometimes associated 
with members’ recognized legal rights. The customary rights are received 
through inheritance, while legal rights are acquired through group 
membership. Customary rights are connected with complex relationships 
among local community members regarding use of resources, and may 
either constrain or facilitate access to the resources for some categories of 
members. Further, differences between members in accessing a resource may   26
be based on socio-economic aspects, such as ethnicity, residence status or 
gender (Engel & Palmer, 2006), wealth status or occupational activity. Users 
of a given renewable resource can cooperate in various ways to manage a 
resource efficiently, or fail to do so (Agrawal, 2003). The management of a 
forest within an organised group could lead to collective action, and its 
emergence is thought to promote successful resource management. 
3.1.3  Collective-action in common-property resource settings 
Scott & Marshall (1998), defined collective action as ‘‘action taken by a 
group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of 
members’ perceived shared interests”. In collective action, members may act 
individually, but more often they act through a group or an organization, 
either independently or with the support or encouragement of external 
agents, e.g. governmental bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
or representatives of development projects (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). 
There is a growing understanding of the importance of social capital for the 
success of any collective-action (Ostrom, 1994; Schmid, 2000). Social capital 
is defined by Putman (1993) as “...features of social organization, such as 
trust, norms (or reciprocity) and networks (or civil engagement), that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions”. 
Further, Narayan (1997) argues that social capital consists of “... the rules, 
norms, obligations, reciprocity and trust embedded in social relations, social 
structures and society’s institutional arrangements which enable members to 
achieve their individual and community objectives”. Thus, social capital is a 
concept that encompasses trust (Coleman, 1988), social norms and 
reciprocity (Putman, 1993), features of social structures and networks (Lin, 
1999; Putman, 2000). Several scholars have drawn attention to the positive 
impact of communication in establishing trust and mutual agreement on 
cooperation (Walker & Ostrom, 2007; Cavalcanti et al., 2010). 
Communication is thought to improve cooperation because additional 
information can be used in solving complex resource issues (Luskin et al., 
2002). Collective action by a well-defined group may be essential for 
developing rules regarding the management and use of a resource between 
people belonging to the group.   27
3.1.4  Factors influencing collective action outcomes in common-property 
settings 
There is a growing understanding that local users can successfully manage 
common property resources (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2003; Bray et al., 
2005). A community forest management program’s success is defined in 
terms of integrated outcomes of ecological sustainability, social equity and 
economic efficiency (Agarwal, 2001; Pagdee et al., 2006) Several 
explanatory factors have been identified as influencing the success and /or 
failure of community-based management schemes (Baland & Platteau, 1996; 
Agarwal, 2001; Dietz et al., 2003; Pagdee et al., 2006; Cavalcanti et al., 
2010). These explanatory factors (the relevance and importance of which 
vary between different places and times), can be attributed to characteristics 
of the resources systems, groups, institutional arrangements and external 
environment. 
There have been several investigations of the relationships between 
biophysical factors or resource conditions and outcomes of the actions of 
organised groups (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1994; Baland & Platteau, 1999). 
These resource conditions are related to the size of the area concerned, 
boundaries of the resource, and proximity of human habitats to the resource. 
Group characteristics that have been postulated to influence collective action 
outcomes include, inter alia, their size, heterogeneity (in various respects), 
and levels of wealth. There is a growing understanding that smaller groups 
are more likely to engage in successful collective action than larger ones 
(Olson, 1965; Baland & Platteau, 1999; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). 
However, Chamberlin (1974) demonstrated that the level of provision of 
collective good increases with group size, despite decreases in the size of 
individuals’ contributions. Further, Olivier and Marwell (1988) argue that 
when a “good has pure jointness of supply and heterogeneity, group size has 
a positive effect on the likelihood that it will be provided”. Gender has also 
been considered as an important factor for successful common-pool forest 
management (Jewitt, 2000; Agrawal, 2003; Agarwal, 2010). Size is related to 
group homogeneity, which has been identified as an important indicator of 
the initiation and continuation of self governance (Ostrom, 1990; Baland & 
Platteau, 1996). The major types of heterogeneity in a given group may be 
racial, ethnic, cultural or economic (Baland & Platteau, 1996). Homogeneity 
of individuals in a group has been postulated to facilitate the emergence of 
cooperative solutions, reductions in hierarchical and conflicting interactions 
and (thus) enhancement of resource management (Agrawal & Gibson,   28
1999). In contrast, Kant (2000) suggested that heterogeneity can create 
diverse and conflicting values and interests that may lead to low levels of 
cooperation and consequently increase environmental degradation. 
Social heterogeneity is postulated to hinder cooperation, since it increases 
transaction costs (Adhikari & Lovet, 2006), reduces levels of trust between 
individuals and hence reduces contributions to the collective good (Alesina 
& Ferrara, 2000; Alesina & Ferrara, 2002). For Agrawal and Gibson (1999), 
a community must have shared characteristics, because shared norms can 
promote conservation (through prohibitive actions) and cooperative 
decision-making within the group. Community-level norms can facilitate 
resource management through the prevention of certain types of behaviour 
and encouragement of others (Coleman, 1990). Wealth disparity among 
community members reportedly has a negative effect on levels of collective 
action (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001) and protection of commons, but its 
effects are apparently weak, provided the interests of wealthy and poor 
people are aligned (Vedeld, 2000).  
Agrawal (2003) suggested that gender-related differences within groups 
also influence the success of common-pool regimes, and that the gender 
composition of local forest management groups can affect prospects for 
forest conservation and regeneration (Agarwal, 2009). Her arguments stem 
from a feminist environmentalism perspective (Shiva, 1989; Shiva, 1994), 
according to which men and women have different relationships with their 
environment. Women in poor rural households are victims of 
environmental degradation in quite gender-specific ways, but are also active 
agents in environmental protection and regeneration (Agarwal, 1992). 
However, intra-gender power struggles, together with socio-cultural factors 
(such as gender divisions of labour) and economic factors can influence 
women’s ability to participate in environmental development (Agarwal, 
1997; Jewitt, 2000). 
The nature of the relationships between groups and external authorities, 
infrastructure and socio-economic phenomena (e.g. roads, markets, 
technology, population pressure and State policies) may also affect users’ 
ability to manage a resource successfully (Agrawal, 2001; Agrawal, 2003). 
Roads have ambiguous implications for forest management. Good roads can 
promote economic development by increasing access to markets (thus 
increasing prices of produce), but they can also increase risks of deforestation 
(Chomitz & Gray, 1995). Ouagadougou is located 150 km from Léo, the   29
district capital of Sissili province. Transportation costs, which are strongly 
related to the distance goods have to be conveyed and the condition of the 
roads, are limiting factors for fuelwood retailers (Arnold & Jongma, 1977). 
Hence, villages within easy reach of markets in urban centres receive more 
profits for their fuelwood when PFM is implemented (Lund, 2007). In 
contrast, the availability of technology may hypothetically lead to 
overharvesting of forest products, and thus is likely to affect the sustainability 
of forest management (Agrawal, 2003). 
Literature on the relationships between demographic changes and resource 
management has a long history and noteworthy theoretical roots. Malthus 
(1798) assumed that the capacity of the population to grow is infinitely 
greater than the capacity of the earth to produce subsistence for mankind, 
since human populations can increase “geometrically” while the food supply 
can only increase “arithmetically”. Therefore, since food is essential for 
human life, unchecked population growth in a given area or the planet 
could lead to starvation. In addition, Malthus (1798), argued that there are 
“preventative checks” (such as birth control and marrying at a later age) and 
“positive checks” (such as famine, disease epidemics and war) on populations 
that slow their growth and prevent them from rapidly growing for too long. 
Subsequent empirical studies have more clearly established relationships 
between populations, demographic changes and community forestry 
resources, e.g. (Henry et al., 2003; Paré et al., 2008; Ouedraogo et al., 2010). 
All three of these studies have stressed that the massive recent population 
growth in Sissili province in southern Burkina Faso could pose threats to the 
sustainability of forest resources in this area. This population growth was due 
to migration of farmers from the northern and central plateau parts of the 
country to the south, following severe droughts in the 1980s in Sahelian 
countries. Recent findings have also identified local governance relations as 
key factors affecting changes in forest conditions (Gibson et al., 2000; Colfer 
& Capistrano, 2005; Colfer & al. ,2008). The international and national 
political interface is also believed to potentially challenge the promotion of 
community-based forest management settings (Ostrom et al., 2002; 
Kaimowitz et al., 2005; Blaikie, 2006). For instance, agri-business (large scale 
farming systems) has been found to contribute to changes in land use, 
accompanied by reductions in forest areas (Paré et al., 2008; Ouedraogo et 
al., 2010). Participation is regarded as a form of group/ collective decision-
making that can also influence the outcome of common property regimes. 
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3.1.5  Politics of participation, power relations and State-community interfaces 
Participation as a management approach and State-community interface 
Public or citizen participation refers to people’s participation at the local 
level, while stakeholder’s participation generally refers to involvement of 
organized groups such as companies, NGOs, etc. (Patel et al., 2007). The 
concepts applied in analysis of participation and participatory processes 
derive from two major backgrounds: political sciences and development 
theory. From the political sciences perspective, participation or participatory 
processes concerns issues related to democracy and citizenship (Smith & 
Ingram, 1993; Wagle, 2000), while development theory perspectives of 
participation are more oriented towards aspects of land use sustainability 
(Nelson & Wright, 1995; Chambers, 1997). Thus, participation can be 
regarded as: (i) an approach or ideology focusing on the analysis and/or 
promotion of community development, and (ii) a method, or set of 
guidelines and practices for involving communities or the general public in 
specific planning activities (Cleaver, 1999; Buchy & Hoverman, 2000).  
Community participation is one approach to citizen participation. It 
involves ordinary citizens, especially local residents, in policy-making 
according to Wagle (2000), who also assumes that the involvement of 
ordinary citizens in policy-making and public affairs leads to policy decisions 
that promote public interests. The participation of communities in public 
actions can take place in diverse ways (e.g. citizen contacts, meetings and 
forest management activities). However, processes of democratisation, 
empowerment and involvement in decision-making are not evident in most 
cases of citizen participation (Cooke & Kothari, 2002). Citizen’s 
participation or involvement varies in form and level. Arnstein (1969) 
describes citizen’s participation in terms of a “ladder” of social power 
structures with eight rungs, rising from non-participation to participation 
with decision-making power. According to Agrawal (2001), participation is 
passive when a “participant is informed of decisions ex post facto; or attends 
meetings, assists in decision-making without speaking up”, and active when 
a “participant expresses opinions whether or not solicited or taking 
initiatives of other sorts”. She also refers to “nominal participation”, 
“consultative participation”, “activity-specific participation” and “interactive 
participation” (empowering), the last of which is seen as the highest degree 
of participation, since it applies when participants have a voice and influence 
group decisions. People’s participation can depend upon many socio-  31
economic factors, as a community might not be a homogeneous social 
structure and gender-, age- or wealth-based discrimination may occur. 
Maskey et al. (2006) argue that the level of participation of users in forest 
management activities is determined by the benefits obtained from the 
common forest resources, and Marinoff (1997) suggests that decentralization 
of power to communities may promote effective participatory policy-
making through raising people’s political consciousness. Participation is 
generally perceived as a means to enable and enhance democracy 
(Appelstrand, 2002), generate empowerment, and enable decision-making 
(Stave, 2002). 
Decentralization has come to be regarded as an essential element of 
environmental and development strategies in developing countries in the last 
two decades. It refers to a process through which powers, responsibilities 
and resources are devolved by the central State to territorial entities at a 
lower level and local government/locally elected re-representatives 
(Andersson, 2003; Ribot, 2004 ; Larson, 2005). However, outcomes of 
decentralization are thought to strongly depend on the type of powers 
transferred to lower levels and the accountability of local governments to 
their constituents (Ribot, 2002b; Larson, 2003). The possibility of attaining 
decision-making power is believed to be one of the major reasons why 
people may decide to get involved in forest management issues (Buchy & 
Hoverman, 2000). However, in any decision-making process, power could 
be expressed through various ways and forms. 
 
Power relations  
Power is a concept that is used to describe relationships between actors and 
their relative strength in negotiations with each other (Yeung, 2005). In the 
research this thesis is based upon, the perspectives of power presented by 
Dahl (1957) and Foucault (1980; 1981) were applied. Dahl (1957) defined 
power as relations of control/influence among people or actors. To specify 
the actors in a power relation, Dahl suggested that “actor A has power over 
actor B to the extent that he/she can get B to do something that B would 
not otherwise do”. The term actors in this context encompasses both people 
and other animate or inanimate objects. Dahl (1957) suggested the following 
considerations to specify the actors in a power relation: a) the source or base 
of the power of the most powerful actor; b) the means or instrument used 
by him/her to exert power over the other(s); c) the amount or extent of   32
his/her power over the other(s); and d) the range or scope of his/her power 
over the other(s). The base of an actor´s power consists of all the resources 
— opportunities, acts and objects that he/she can exploit in order to affect 
the behaviour of another actor (Dahl, 1957). 
According to Foucault (1981), power is not something that is acquired, 
seized or shared, something one holds on to or allows to slip away”. In other 
words, power is a strategy; it is exercised rather than possessed and is 
constituted in social relationships, such as networks, alliances and conflicts. 
Power is employed at all levels and through various dimensions, and 
Foucault suggests that the key question is how power is applied. For him, 
power leads to knowledge, which in turn feeds power. “....It is not possible 
for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for 
knowledge not to engender power” (Foucault, 1980). Applying this 
rationale to  forest management, an actor’s access to forest resources or 
his/her participation in the program may be influenced, for instance, by 
his/her identity, position in relation to institutions both outside and inside 
the household, and gender. For instance, in the context of southern Burkina 
Faso, owning larger pieces of land, possessing important income sources, 
having broader networks, holding leadership positions in the village, being 
able to access information and securing political support may all be sources 
of power for participants in forest management. However, power relations 
can also change over time. Power analysis can be extended to quantitative 
studies, in which it could be perceived as coercion. Following Dahl’s 
concept of power, cause and effect relationships that can be measured 
empirically express a situation of power relationship. Such a conception of 
power is embedded in behaviourism, a central principle of which is to “treat 
social explanation as no different in principle from the explanation of non-
social phenomena” (Clegg, 1989). As argued by Sayer (1992) “what 
produces an event has nothing to do with the number of times it has been 
observed to occur and nothing to do with whether we happen to be able to 
predict it”. These considerations show that discovering how a given power 
is constituted could be an important step in the research process, and that 
participatory forest management programs involve social interactions that 
must be understood to examine how power is expressed and exercised in 
them. 
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4  Research methods 
4.1  Study area and the settings  
The work underlying this thesis was carried out in the forest management 
areas of the Centre-West Region, one of Burkina Faso’s 13 administrative 
regions. The main reason for selecting this region was its importance for 
supplying fuelwood to the main cities; notably it supplies more than 75% of 
the wood used as fuel in Ouagadougou (Ouedraogo, 2002 ). The region has 
four provinces – Boulkiemdé, Sanguié, Sissili and Ziro – and the capital is 
Koudougou. The focus of the research was mainly on the forest 
management sites located in Sissili and Ziro provinces. Both provinces are 
located in southern Burkina Faso and lie between 11°02’-12°00’ N and 
01°30’- 2°80’W (Figure 1). The areas are characterized by low relief with an 
average altitude of 300 m above sea level, and consist of cultivated lands, 
settlements, open savanna, and clusters of woodlands and dry forests. The 
natural vegetation in both provinces includes Sissili State classified forest, 
Kaboré Tambi national park, the  forest buffer zone bordering the Sissili 
forest, forest management units (FMUs) and unprotected forests. 
Unprotected forests constitute bush lands in the vicinity of villages and trees 
on fallows. The dominating trees species in the study area are: Vitellaria 
paradoxa Gaertn. F., Parkia biglobosa (Jacq.) R. Br ex G. Don., Tamarindus 
indica L., Afzelia Africana Smith ex Pers, Pterocarpus erinaceus Poir and Kaya 
Senegalensis (Desv.) A. Juss (Paré et al., 2008). Phyto-geographically, Sissili 
and Ziro provinces are located within the Sudanian or south-Sudanian 
ecological zone White (1983). 
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Figure 1. Map of the study area.   35
The population of Sissili and Ziro provinces in Burkina Faso consists of 
indigenous ethnic groups of Nuni and Wala, and migrant groups consisting 
mainly of Mossi and Fulani. The Mossi originated from the central plateau 
region of the country, while the Fulani people are herders from the 
northern region of Burkina Faso. Due to the harsh environmental 
conditions, exacerbated by persistent droughts (in 1973-74 and 1983-1984), 
the Mossi and Fulani people migrated from their respective areas to the 
southern region of the country in search of farmlands and pastures for their 
animals, respectively (Delnooz, 1999; Ouédraogo, 2003 ). The agricultural 
system is largely traditional subsistence farming dominated by cereals (e.g. 
sorghum, millet and maize) and tubers (yam and sweet potatoes), together 
with cultivation of cash crops (cotton and cashews). However, in the last 
decade, a more lucrative productive system, characterized by fuelwood 
extraction, cultivation of cash crops (cotton and cashews) and ranching, has 
emerged (Paré et al., 2008). 
 
Following a fuelwood crisis in the 1970s (Dang, 1993), Burkina Faso 
embarked on a tree planting program (mainly Eucalyptus) to meet the 
fuelwood demand. However, the plantation efforts have not been successful 
(Delnooz, 1999), mainly due to the lack of interest from the local 
populations. Consequently, a natural forest management program was 
initiated in the 1980s, focused geographically on the southern part of the 
country. Subsequently it was implemented with the assistance of a 
UNDP/FAO project between 1986 and 1998. The program was 
implemented in three phases, in which schemes or forest management 
domain were established in Nazinon, Ziro and Sissili provinces in 1986-
1990, 1990-1994 and 1994-1998, respectively, where 1994-1998 is the 
period of the third phase. Examples of forest management schemes are 
Nazinon; Cassou, Bougnounou and Sapouy-Biéha in Ziro province, and 
Tô-Léo, Silly-Zawara –Pouni in Sissili province. The focus of this thesis 
and related studies is on Sapouy-Biéha in Ziro province and Tô-Léo in 
Sissili province. The forest management domains or schemes are subdivided 
into forest management units (FMUs). The program has particularly stressed 
the importance of local people’s participation in managing the natural forests 
(Delnooz, 1999; Ribot, 1999). In this participatory forest management 
program, the villagers have organized themselves into forest management 
groups and entered into management agreements with the Forestry Service 
at the provincial level, mainly through management plans intended to foster 
ecosystem conservation and biodiversity protection, while enabling the local   36
people to benefit from the forests (Bellefontaine et al., 2000). At the end of 
the program, management of all the forest domains was transferred to the 
Union of Forest Management Groups, and the Ministry in charge of forests 
through its regional and provincial offices, responsible for providing 
technical support (Delnooz, 1999; Yéyé, 2000). The forests allocated to the 
FMUs and the unprotected forests provide common interests for local 
people in terms of access to forest resources (e.g. fuelwood and NTFPs). 
4.2  Data collection and analyses 
4.2.1  Study I 
This study dealt with determinants of access to forest products by the local 
people. In this context, access was perceived as “the ability to benefit from 
things – including material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols” 
(Ribot & Peluso, 2003), encompassing both entering into a defined physical 
property and obtaining products of a resource – access and withdrawal sensu 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992). To examine how key household characteristics 
and other constraints related to customary rights and formal forest laws 
influence access to the forests for fuelwood collection, extraction of NTFPs 
and grazing livestock by local people, a household survey was conducted in 
seven districts in Sissili province. The survey was conducted in 30% of the 
villages in each of the seven districts, resulting in 45 sample villages. A local 
census was then conducted in the selected villages to obtain an estimate of 
the population size. The households were stratified by gender and residence 
status, and 30% of the households in each sample village were randomly 
selected for the survey, yielding a total of 1865 sample households. The 
respondents were heads of the household, men or women, and each 
respondent was interviewed separately. A pre-tested semi-structured 
questionnaire was used for gathering information, and each interview lasted 
up to an hour. The checklist of issues discussed during the interview 
contained the following questions. Do you collect fuelwood and NTFPs 
from the forest management units and from the unprotected forest in the 
village? Do you graze your livestock in the forest management units and the 
unprotected forest in the village? Is there any constraint in accessing forest 
products? In addition, the following personal information was recorded for 
each respondent: household size, gender, age, residence status (indigenous 
versus migrant), education level, occupation and income-generating 
activities.   37
To assess the significance of socio-economic determinants of access to the 
forest for fuelwood collection, extraction of NTFPs and grazing livestock, 
three stepwise binary logistic regression models were developed, using the 
backward elimination procedure. The logistic model predicts the logit of 
the response variable (Y) from the explanatory variables (X). The logit is the 
natural logarithm (ln) of odds of Y, where odds are ratios of probabilities (π) 
of Y happening to probabilities (1 - π) of Y not happening. The logistic 
model is specified as: 
ln (π/ 1- π)= βo +β1x1i+ β2x2i +... βkxki 
where  βo is the intercept and β1,  β2,...  βk are the coefficients of the 
independent variables x1, x2, ...xk. The explanatory variables were gender, 
age, household size, ethnic group, residence status, level of education, 
source of income and occupation. Dichotomous explanatory variables 
(gender and residence status) were coded by assigning 0 to one case and 1 to 
the other. For multinomial explanatory variables, coding was done by 
assigning 1.0 to the lowest number of cases and sequentially higher values 
for others. The response variables were access to the forest for collecting 
fuelwood, extraction of NTFPs, and grazing livestock, which were defined 
as binary variables with a value 1.0 for respondents having access to the 
forest product or 0.0 otherwise. Before performing the logistic regression, 
multivariate correlation analysis was applied to check for co-linearity 
between the explanatory variables. The tolerance values were all above the 
recommended threshold, thus there were no co-linearity problems. The 
significance of the logistic regression parameters was assessed by Chi-square 
likelihood ratio and deviation tests, and Hosmer-Lemeshow’s and Wald’s 
statistics. The significance of differences in effects of other customary 
regulations and formal forest law-related constraints to access forest products 
related to the investigated household characteristics were analyzed by χ
2 –
tests. 
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Table 1. Description and summary statistics of the variables used in the binary logistic model 
Characteristics   Number of 
observations 
Fuelwood NWFP  Grazing 
Yes No  Yes No  Yes  No 
Gender                      
   Female  904  461  469  723  207  512  418 
 Male  908  453  482 725  210  514  421 
Age class (years)                      
    < 25  172  91  84  141  34  105  70 
    25 – 45  1048  563  499  845  217  627  435 
    45 – 65  496  212  296  381  127  244  264 
    > 65  96  38  58  64  32  40  56 
Household size                       
   < 5  461  250  219  337  132  254  215 
   6 – 10  880  431  472  715  188  510  393 
   10 – 15  284  132  155  234  53  156  131 
   16 – 20  96  40  57  78  19  42  55 
    > 20  91  54  39  71  22  57  36 
Residence status                      
   Indigenous  914  487  427  825  89  568  346 
   Migrant  935  427  524  623  328  458  493 
Ethnic groups                      
   Nuni  774  410  396  729  77  491  315 
   Mossi  644  279  383  418  244  295  367 
 Sissala  78  74  4  75  3  76  2 
 Dagara  87  78  10  81  7  70  18 
 Fulani  190  58  134 108  84 80  112 
 Minority  39  15  24  37  2  14  25 
Educational level             
 Illiteracy  1340  692  679 287  1084  607  764 
 Primary  School 198  102  99  24  177  89  112 
 Secondary  school  31  12  20  7  25 18  14 
 Religious  education  127  56  74  56  74 67  63 
  Adult education   101  43  58  43  58  45  56 
 Agricultural 
training 
15 4  11  0  15  7  8 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Characteristics Number  of 
observations 
Fuelwood NWFP  Grazing 
Yes No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Educational level                      
   Illiteracy  1340  692  679  287  1084  607  764 
   Primary school  198  102  99  24  177  89  112 
   Secondary school  31  12  20  7  25  18  14 
   Religious education  127  56  74  56  74  67  63 
   Adult education   101  43  58  43  58  45  56 
   Agricultural training  15  4  11  0  15  7  8 
Occupation              
 Farmer  598  412  186 543  55  454  144 
 Herder  125  89  36  117  8  94  31 
  Farmer + Herder  1112  409  703  772  340  469  643 
  Farmer + Herder + 
Woodcutter 
30 4  26  16  14  9  21 
Source of income               
  SNTFP + SCC + 
SL 
842 365  512  684  193  379  498 
 SNTFP  123  95  34  95  34  108  21 
 SCC  201  170  32  173  29  170  32 
  SL    93    50  44  67  27  54  40 
  SNTFP + SCC  217  118  103  206  15  181  40 
  SNTFP + SL  198    59  142  131  70  73  128 
  SCC + SL  130    55  77  86  46  58  74 
  Salary      9     2  7  6  3  3  6 
SNTFP: selling of non-timber forest products; SCC: selling of cash crops; SL: 
selling of livestock.   40
4.2.2  Study II 
This study examined the extent to which the local people participate in the 
forest management program and whether household characteristics of 
members of the forest management groups (FMGs) influence their decision 
to participate in the program. Participation was regarded, sensu Little (1994) 
as “an active process whereby beneficiary or client groups influence the 
direction and execution of the development or management of a natural 
resource to enhance their well-being in terms of income, personal growth, 
self-reliance or other values.” Consequently, 15 participation indicators 
(Table 2) of the means whereby members of the FMG influence the 
direction and execution of forest management program were identified 
based on focus group discussions (with leaders of the forest management 
cooperatives, local chiefs, government officials, etc.) and participation 
indicators identified through literature reviews (Atmis et al., 2009; Dolisca et 
al., 2006; Lise, 2000). The main data source for this study was a survey of 
household representatives. More detailed information on factors influencing 
participation in the forest management program was obtained by conducting 
a household survey in 11 villages associated with the forest management 
program. From the list of members of the forest management group (FMG) 
in each village, 15 individuals were randomly selected for the survey, 
providing a total of 165 samples (both men and women) from 11 villages. 
They were asked the following questions. How often are you involved in 
forest management activities? How do you rank your involvement in forest 
management activities compared to other FMG members? How often are 
you involved in decision-making compared to other members? How often 
do you attend meetings of the FMG in comparison to other members? How 
do you rank the benefits you obtain from forest management activities with 
respect to the other members? The respondents’ demographic and socio-
economic characteristics, including their education, gender, age, residence 
status and land tenure status, forest-based income-generating activities and 
household size were also recorded. Respondents were also asked if they had 
received any technical assistance from the State forest service or non-
governmental organizations and their opinions about the influence of 
government policy on the extent of their participation in the forest 
management program (see Appendix 1). 
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Table 2. Names, abbreviations and scales of participation indicators included in the factor analysis 
No  Names of the variables  Abbreviation  Scale 
1  Benefit from fuelwood cutting  IFWC  [1-4] 
2  Involvement in NTFP exploitation  INTE  [1-4] 
3  Involvement in forest regeneration  IFRE  [1-4] 
4  Involvement in firebreak maintenance  IFBK  [1-4] 
5  Involvement in forest protection (reporting illegal 
activities) 
IFPR [1-4] 
6  Involvement in forest monitoring and evaluation  IFME  [1-4] 
7  Attendance of meetings  ATME  [1-4] 
8  Suggestions during meetings  SUME  [1-4] 
9  Ability to influence decisions during meetings  AIDM  [1-4] 
10  Agreements on decisions during meetings  AGDM  [1-4] 
11  Fairness and transparency in forest-based income 
allocation 
FABS [1-4] 
12  Frequency of meetings  FRME  [1-4] 
13  Generate household income  GHHI  [1-4] 
14  Create employment opportunity  CEOP  [1-4] 
15  Enabling micro-economic activities  EMAC  [1-4] 
Descriptive analysis was then applied to summarize profiles of the 
respondents and information related to people’s participation in the forest 
management program. Factor analysis was employed to identify latent 
dimensions underlying indicators of farmers’ participation. Each factor was 
interpreted according to its loading, i.e. the strength of its correlations with 
the original variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) was used to extract factors, using Varimax rotation to ensure 
that the extracted factors were independent and unrelated to each other, and 
to maximize the loading on each variable and minimize the loading on other 
factors (Bryman & Cramer, 2005). The relevance of factor analysis for the 
data set was tested using the Bartlett Test of Sphericity and the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (Kaiser, 1974) measures of sampling adequacy. The number of 
significant factors was determined by calculating the eigenvalue for each 
factor (variance it accounted for) and confirmed by a Scree test and Monte 
Carlo PCA for parallel analysis (Watkins, 2000). Factors with eigenvalues 
exceeding 1.5 were considered significant following Kaiser’s criterion. 
Multiple linear regression analysis was performed to assess the associations 
between participation indicators and respondents’ socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics. The following model was developed using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression.   42
Factori = Constant + β1GDE+ β2MAS + β3AGE + β4HHS + β5PFM 
+ β6EDL + β7RES + β8LTS + β9TEA + β10AGP + ɛ 
 
where  Factori are the factors identified from factor analysis, βi is the 
coefficient of the socio-economic, demographic and policy-related variables, 
and ɛ is the error term. The subject score for each factor was determined 
following the Anderson-Rubin approach (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
4.2.3  Study III 
This study examined the variation in member’s perception of the 
performance of four forest management units in Sissili and Ziro provinces 
and assessed the factors influencing members’ perceptions of the 
performance. Both group discussions and a household survey were used to 
collect data on perceptions of the performance of the four forest 
management groups. The focus group discussions were held with leaders of 
the forest management groups, local government officers and NGOs to 
obtain qualitative information pertaining to the performance of the 
participatory forest management program. The indicators of participation 
(Table 2) identified in the previous studies were used as a basis for evaluating 
the performance of the FMUs. These indicators pertained to economic 
performance (benefits from fuelwood cutting, extraction of NTFPs, 
generation of household income, creation of employment opportunities and 
enablement of micro-economic activities), forest conservation (forest 
regeneration, maintenance of firebreaks, forest protection, and forest 
monitoring & evaluation), and decision-making (attendance of meetings, 
frequency of meetings, making suggestions during meetings, ability to 
influence decisions in meetings, agreements on decisions during meetings 
and equity in benefit allocation). Data on perceptions of performance of the 
FMUs were collected through a household survey of 216 members of four 
FMUs from 11 surrounding villages. Through random sampling, 20 
respondents were selected in each village except one where the total number 
of group members was 16. The respondents, household heads (both men 
and women), were asked to score each performance indicator of the 
collective action on a 4-point Likert-scale: 1 = bad, 2 = satisfactory, 3 = 
good and 4 = very good. The respondents were also asked about their 
knowledge and awareness of any problems related to the forest environment, 
as well as their opinions about the influence of group size and ethnic 
dissociation on the performance of their village forest management program 
(see appendix 2).   43
The variation in performance scores of the four FMUs was analyzed by 
multivariate analysis of variance. Pearson correlation analysis was applied to 
examine the relationships between scores of each performance indicator and 
resource-base, group size and proximity to the main fuelwood market. 
Multinomial regression analysis was performed to evaluate whether the 
variation in performance of the FMUs was associated with members’ 
knowledge of the forest environment, their perception of group size and 
heterogeneity. The dependent variables were scores for each performance 
indicator and the mean of each set of economic, conservation and decision-
making indicators, which were regressed on the independent variables 
according to the following model: 
Yi= α +β1x1+ β2x2 + β3x3 + error 
where Yi is the value of the dependent variable, α is a constant and βi are the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables, knowledge of the forest 
environment (x1), perception of group size (x2) and perception of group 
heterogeneity (x3). During the model construction, variables with F values  
0.050 and ≥ 0.100 were entered, and removed, respectively. 
4.2.4  Study IV  
This study reviewed progress made towards developing policies and 
programs to promote sustainable management of forests in Burkina Faso and 
identify the constraints and challenges for the implementation of 
decentralization in the context of forest management. Data were gathered 
through a review of relevant policy documents and literature, and the focus 
group method. The grey literature reviewed concerned the decentralization 
process and the policy reforms related to forestry in Burkina Faso. The focus 
group method was employed as tool to identify and assess the issues 
concerning, and challenges facing, decentralization of forest management in 
the Central-west region. The focus groups were identified on the basis of 
their involvement in the participatory forest management program and 
decentralization process. Subsequently, an invitation letter was sent to 
central, regional and local government bodies, the technical assistance group, 
the fuelwood sellers cooperative and community-based organizations in the 
Centre-west region of Burkina Faso, as well as representatives of NGOs. A 
two-day workshop was organized at the Sissili provincial capital (Léo). 
During the first day of the workshop the participants were introduced to the 
research problem; i.e., what are the issues and challenges for the 
implementation of decentralized forest management? Then four discussion   44
groups were organized, consisting of village councillors and chiefs, district 
governors (mayors or their representatives), technical support groups 
(experts from the central, regional and provincial agriculture, forest and 
animal husbandry services), and the forest management groups. Participants 
were asked to list and discuss issues related to the resource-base, 
accountability, transparency and empowerment, and the challenges posed by 
these issues to the decentralization of the existing forest management 
program in the region. Each group had a moderator in charge of facilitating 
the discussions and a secretary responsible for taking notes of the points 
raised by the group; both the moderators and secretaries were researchers 
from Centre National de Recherche Scientifique et Technologique, Institut 
de l’Environnement et de Recherche Agricole. 
After sufficiently deliberating on the issues, each group presented a 
synthesis of their findings to all participants, which was followed by further 
discussion on the issues to stimulate the flow of details and impressions of 
the participants. By the end of the session, the outputs from each focus 
group discussion were used to generate a final set of opinions about the 
themes. On the second day, the participants were provided with a synthesis 
of the issues identified during the previous day and asked to rank them 
according to their degree of importance. The rankings by each focus group 
were then presented to all participants and further discussed to obtain 
insights into their agreements/disagreements. The discussions were held in 
French if all the members in the group were French-speaking, and otherwise 
translated into the local language, Nuni. The group discussions and the 
synthesis sessions were tape-recorded in order to facilitate compilation of 
data. The group discussion with representatives of the cooperative of 
fuelwood wholesalers and retailers was held separately, as this group has a 
stake in the forest management program but is not directly involved in the 
decentralization process. The discussion with this group mainly focused on 
issues relevant to the association, such as challenges related to fuelwood 
marketing and transparency in fuelwood transactions. The acquired 
information was used to cross-check the points related to transparency and 
accountability issues raised during the workshop. 
The information gathered from the focus group discussion was 
subsequently transcribed using open coding – a process of breaking down, 
examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing the information 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Thus, major issues and challenges identified by 
participants were categorized into unifying concepts, and the participants re-  45
grouped into executives (district governors, village councillors and village 
chiefs), grass-root actors (the forest management groups) and technical 
support groups (experts from governmental and non-governmental 
organizations). The original rankings made by the focus groups were re-
worked as per the new groupings by taking mean ranks.  
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5  Results  
5.1   Determinants of access to forest products 
The relationships between respondents’ household characteristics and the 
likelihood that they would have access to fuelwood, NTFPs and forest for 
grazing livestock was investigated using logistic regression analysis. The 
likelihood of access to fuelwood was found to be significantly associated 
with ethnicity, occupation and sources of income of the household. The 
overall assessment of the logistic regression model and Hosmer–Lemeshow 
goodness-of-fit statistics revealed that it adequately fitted the data [[
2 (22, 1812)= 
247.568, p < 0.001] with 70% correct prediction. The likelihood of 
respondents’ having access to fuelwood was 8.3% and 3.1% higher for Sissala 
and Dagara, respectively, than for Nuni, Mossi, Fulani and minority ethnic 
groups (Table 3). Respondents engaged in either farming or animal 
husbandry had 1.9% and 3.5% more likelihood of access to fuelwood, 
respectively, than those engaged in both activities. In turn, those engaged in 
both farming and animal husbandry had better access than those involved in 
combined activities of farming, animal husbandry and wood cutting. Thus, 
the more diverse the source of income of the respondents, the lower was 
their likelihood of access to fuelwood (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Logistic regression predicting likelihood of reporting access to fuelwood. Note that the reference 
group in each explanatory variable is not included 
Variables  i s.e.  i Wald   
χ
2 -test  
d.f. Sig.  Odds 
Ratio (e) 
95.0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Age class     11.254  3  0.010       
 <  25  -0.021  0.151  0.020  1  0.887  0.979  0.728  1.316 
  25 – 45  0.281  0.095  8.736  1  0.003  1.324  1.099  1.594 
  45 – 65  -0.082  0.109  0.574  1  0.449  0.921  0.744  1.140 
Ethnic group     55.933  5  0.000       
 Nuni  -0.390  0.147  7.040 1 0.008  0.677  0.508  0.903 
 Mossi  -0.541  0.151  12.780 1  0.000  0.582  0.433 0.783 
 Sissala  2.112  0.454  21.660 1  0.000  8.261  3.395 20.101 
 Dagara  1.133  0.334  11.506  1  0.001  3.106  1.614  5.979 
 Fulani  -1.196  0.220  29.516 1  0.000  0.302  0.196 0.466 
Occupation     97.598  3  0.000       
 Farmer  0.659  0.175  14.177 1  0.000  1.933  1.372 2.725 
 Herder  1.244  0.218  32.632  1  0.000  3.468  2.264  5.314 
 Farmer  + 
Herder 
-0.305 0.162  3.528  1  0.060  0.737  0.536  1.013 
Source of 
income 
             
 SNTFP  + 
SCC + SL 
-0.184 0.178  1.076  1  0.300  0.832  0.587  1.178 
 SNTFP  1.238  0.254  23.701  1 0.000  3.448  2.095  5.674 
 SCC  1.177  0.241  23.748  1  0.000  3.244  2.021  5.207 
 SL  1.065  0.270  15.546  1 0.000  2.902  1.709  4.927 
 SNTFP  + 
SCC 
-0.283 0.209  1.830  1  0.176  0.754  0.500  1.135 
 SNTFP  + 
SL 
-0.266 0.220  1.469  1  0.226  0.766  0.498  1.178 
  SCC + SL  -0.370  0.237  2.431 1 0.119  0.691  0.434  1.100 
 Constant  0.129  0.246  0.276  1  0.600  1.138     
SNTFP: selling of non-timber forest products; SCC: selling of cash crop; SL: selling of 
livestock; Hosmer & Lemeshow Test: Chi-square = 12.85, d.f. = 8, p = 0.117; -2 Log 
likelihood = 2075.91; Cox & Snell r
2 = 0.21; Nagelkerke r
2 = 0.29; overall percentage of 
correct prediction = 70.3%. 
With regard to the likelihood of access to forests for grazing livestock, the 
model fitted the data well [
2 (22, 1812) = 211.407, p < 0.001] with 73% correct   48
prediction. Ethnic group, household size, age, gender, occupation and 
source of income were key household characteristics that significantly 
determined access to the forest for grazing livestock (Table 4). The Sissala 
ethnic group was more likely (15.3%) to have access to the forest for 
livestock grazing than other ethnic groups. However, the Mossi and Fulani 
groups had a lower likelihood of access to the forest for grazing than the 
minority groups (collectively the reference group in the model). 
Respondents with small (< 5 individuals) and very large (> 20 individuals) 
households were 1.1% less likely to have access to the forest for livestock 
grazing than medium-sized households. Adult heads of households (45-65 
years old) also had more chance of forest access for grazing livestock. Men 
had 1.2% more chance to access the forest for grazing livestock than women. 
The more diversified the occupation and source of income of the 
respondent, the lower was the likelihood of access to the forest resource for 
grazing livestock. 
The regression model for access to NTFPs was significant [(
2 (22, 1812)= 
336.229, p < 0.001)] and the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test 
showed it provided an adequate fit to the data, with 82% correct prediction. 
Key determinants of access to NTFPs were gender, ethnic group, education 
level, household size, age, occupation and source of income (Table 5). The 
likelihood of access to NTFPs was 1.2% lower for households headed by 
women than for those headed by men. Among ethnic groups, Mossi and 
Fulani were less likely to have access, while Nuni, Sissala and Dagara were 
more likely to have access to NTFPs than the minority group. Compared 
with respondents who had received agricultural training, the likelihood of 
access to NTFPs was lower for all other respondents of all education levels, 
except illiterate individuals who had similar probability of access. The larger 
the household size of the respondent, the higher was the likelihood of access 
to NTFPs. Respondents within the most active age band (24-45 years) had a 
better chance of access to NTFPs compared with older respondents. The 
likelihood of access to NTFPs was lower for respondents engaged in more 
than one activity, and for respondents who generated their income through 
sale of NTFPs, sale of cash crops or sale of cash crops and livestock. 
Interestingly, the likelihood of access to NTFPs was high when respondents 
sold NTFPs and other agricultural products, such as cash crops and livestock, 
as shown by their relatively high odds ratios.  49
Table 4. Logistic regression predicting likelihood of reporting access to forest land for livestock grazing. 
Note that the reference group in each explanatory variable is not included 
Variables  i s.e.  i Wald   
χ
2 -test  
d.f. Sig. Odds 
Ratio (e) 
95.0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Gender   0.180  0.060  8.934  1  0.003  1.197  1.064  1.347 
Age class (years)     13.637  3  0.003       
 <  25  0.152  0.161  0.887  1  0.346  1.164  0.849  1.595 
  25 – 45  0.326  0.099  10.795  1  0.001  1.385  1.140  1.682 
  45 – 65  -0.045  0.113  0.161  1  0.689  0.956  0.766  1.193 
Household size     11.476  4  0.015       
 <  5  -0.255 0.122  4.376  1  0.036  0.775  0.611  0.984 
  5 – 10  0.018  0.100  0.032  1  0.858  1.018  0.837  1.238 
  11 – 15  0.073  0.131  0.307  1  0.580  1.075  0.831  1.391 
 >  20  -0.375 0.195  3.683  1  0.055  0.687  0.469  1.008 
Ethnic group     39.321  5  0.000       
 Nuni  -0.075 0.169  0.197 1  0.657  0.928 0.665 1.293 
 Mossi  -0.467 0.172  7.323 1  0.007  0.627 0.447 0.879 
 Sissala  2.731  0.619  19.431 1 0.000  15.345 4.557  51.674 
 Dagara  -0.122 0.296  0.171  1  0.679  0.885  0.495  1.581 
 Fulani  -0.576 0.230  6.264 1  0.012  0.562 0.358 0.883 
Occupation     90.357  3  0.000       
Farmer 0.572  0.157  13.194  1 0.000  1.771  1.301  2.411 
Herder 1.028  0.209  24.160  1  0.000  2.796  1.856  4.213 
Farmer + Herder  -0.501  0.140 12.786  1  0.000  0.606  0.460  0.797 
Source of income   130.866  7  0.000     
SNTFP + SCC 
+ SL 
-0.610 0.149  16.670  1  0.000  0.544  0.406  0.728 
SNTFP 1.378  0.272  25.601  1 0.000  3.967  2.326  6.765 
SCC 1.378  0.272  25.601  1  0.000  3.967  2.326  6.765 
SL 0.843  0.226  13.935  1  0.000 2.324  1.493  3.620 
SNTFP + SCC  0.429  0.247  3.029 1  0.082  1.536 0.947 2.490 
SNTFP + SL  0.892  0.208  18.401 1 0.000  2.441  1.624  3.669 
SNTFP + SL  -0.604  0.192  9.875 1  0.002  0.547 0.375 0.797 
SCC + SL  -0.747  0.213  12.343 1 0.000  0.474  0.312  0.719 
Constant -0.598  0.230  6.727  1  0.009  1.818     
SNTFP: selling of non-timber forest products; SCC: selling of cash crop; SL: selling of livestock. 
Hosmer & Lemeshow Test: Chi-square = 9.22, d.f. = 8, p = 0.324; -2 Log likelihood = 1990.64; Cox 
& Snell r
2 = 0.24; Nagelkerke r
2 = 0.32; overall percentage of right prediction = 72.5%.   50
Table 5. Logistic regression predicting likelihood of reporting access to non-wood forest product. Note 
that the reference group in each explanatory variable is not included 
 
Variables 
i s.e.  i Wald   
χ
2 -test  
Df Sig.  Odds 
Ratio (e) 
95.0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Gender (F = 
0, M = 1) 
0.252 0.072  12.300  1  0.000  1.286  1.117  1.480 
Age class     9.238  3  0.026       
  <  25 0.140 0.194  0.523 1  0.470  1.151  0.786  1.683 
  25 – 45  0.309  0.115  7.244  1  0.007  1.362  1.088  1.705 
  45 – 65  0.012  0.128  0.009  1  0.924  1.012  0.788  1.301 
Household 
size 
   18.495  4  0.001       
 <  5  -0.573  0.143  16.066  1  0.000  0.564  0.426  0.746 
  5 – 10  -0.030  0.120  0.062  1  0.804  0.971  0.767  1.229 
  11 – 15  0.247  0.164  2.261  1  0.133  1.280  0.928  1.765 
  16 – 20  0.167  0.243  0.470  1  0.493  1.181  0.734  1.903 
Ethnic group     139.003  5  0.000       
 Nuni  0.326  0.217  21.143  1 0.133  1.385  0.906 2.118 
 Mossi  -1.423  0.207  0.068 1  0.00  0.241  0.161  0.362 
 Sissala  1.568  0.532  0.535 1  0.003  4.798  1.692  13.601 
 Dagara  0.303  0.416  16.407  1  0.466  1.354  0.599  3.060 
 Fulani  -1.453  0.260  4.291 1  0.000  0.234  0.140  0.390 
Education     47.200  5  0.000       
 Illiterate  0.397  0.267  2.213 1  0.137  1.487  0.882  2.508 
 Primary  -0.35  0.54  0.42 1  0.517  0.705  0.245  2.03 
 Secondary -0.939  0.226  17.325 1 0.000  0.391  0.251 0.608 
 Religious  -1.409  0.263  28.592 1 0.000  0.244  0.146 0.41 
 Adult  -0.109  0.444  0.45  1  0.998  0.160  0  . 
Occupation     56.535  3  0.000       
 Farmer  0.562  0.196  8.205 1  0.004  1.754  1.194  2.576 
  Herder  1.040 0.333  9.764 1  0.002  2.829  1.473  5.431 
 Farmer  + 
Herder 
-0.660 0.163  16.325 1 0.000  0.517  0.375 0.712 
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Table 5. (Continued)  
Variables  i s.e.  i Wald   
χ
2 -test  
Df Sig.  Odds 
Ratio (e) 
95.0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Source of 
income 
   45.949  7  0.000       
 SNTFP 
+ SCC 
+ SL 
0.477 0.162  8.677 1  0.003  1.611  1.173  2.212 
 SNTFP -0.621  0.243  6.537 1  0.011  0.537  0.334  0.865 
 SCC  -0.096  0.244  0.154  1  0.695  0.909  0.563  1.467 
 SL  0.703  0.269  6.807  1 0.009  2.020  1.191 3.425 
 SNTFP 
+ SCC 
1.106 0.283  15.296  1  0.000  3.022  1.736  5.260 
 SNTFP 
+ SL 
0.284 0.205  1.926 1  0.165  1.328  0.890  1.984 
 SCC  + 
SL 
-0.526 0.224  5.505  1  0.019  0.591  0.381 0.917 
Constant  4.744 1657.839  0.000 1  0.998  114.856    
SNTFP: selling of non-timber forest products; SCC: selling of cash crop; SL: selling of livestock. 
Hosmer & Lemeshow Test: Chi-square = 21.96, d.f. = 8, p = 0.501; -2 Log likelihood = 1488.68; Cox 
& Snell r
2 = 0.22; Nagelkerke r
2 = 0.33; overall percentage of right prediction = 81.8%. 
The respondents stated that access to forest products was essential for their 
livelihoods. However, 6% of the rural respondents reported that they had 
difficulty in obtaining NTFPs and fuelwood. The major constraints to 
accessing forest products in Sissili province were the forest law and 
traditional rules of land and resource tenure. The responses reflected 
ambiguities regarding rights of control and ownership of the forest lands and 
the resources they offer. The forests are located on lands with multiple 
overlapping traditional and modern rights. Prevailing land law does not 
recognize customary land rights; all land is considered State property, and 
anyone seeking access to land must apply for use rights. On the other hand, 
local communities do not recognize this State ownership and regard 
themselves as the true owners of their land, by virtue of their ancestral 
rights. Further, while the State's monopoly of land ownership is theoretical, 
the traditional rules are still observed by the local communities under the 
leadership of indigenous ethnic group elders. The forest law, ‘Code 
Forestier’ adopted in 1997, specifies the access rights of users and the guiding 
principles for usufructuary rights and practices. This law precludes livestock 
grazing from managed forest, thereby limiting access to forest pastures by   52
livestock herders. Respondents mentioned that the lack of official 
recognition of traditional forest access rights has contributed to tenure 
instability. It has also encouraged a short-term mentality in the use of forest 
resources, for example through illegal harvesting of wood, NWFPs and 
charcoal processing, which compromises the sustainability of forest 
resources. 
5.2   Factors influencing people’s participation in forest 
management program 
A typology of participation, involving 15 participatory indicators, was 
applied to examine the extent of participation of members of the forest 
management group in the participatory program. Factor analysis summarized 
the original 15 participatory indicators into three factors, which accounted 
for 64.82% of the total variance (Table 6). The most influential variables for 
the first factor, which explained 28.56% of the variation, are mostly 
indicators related to people’s attitude towards the decision-making process 
(ability to influence decisions in meetings, agreement with decisions made 
during meetings, aptitude at making suggestions during meetings and 
meeting attendance) and were, thus, termed indicators of participation in 
decision-making. Agreement with decisions during meetings had the highest 
loading (0.923), followed by attendance at meetings (0.913), which may be 
considered the first step towards participation in the decision-making 
process.   53
Table 6. PCA loadings for indicators of participation in forest management 
Description    Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Communality 
          
Decision-making indicators           
Agreements on decision during 
meetings  
  0.923  0.083 0.181 0.891 
Attendance to meetings     0.913  0.047 0.179 0.867 
Ability to influence decisions in 
meetings  
  0.836  0.239 0.034 0.757 
Suggestion during meetings     0.834  0.118 0.181 0.742 
Fairness and transparency in 
income allocation  
  0.520  0.258 -0.046  0.339 
Involvement in decision on 
forest monitoring & evaluation  
  0.500  0.344 -0.019  0.369 
Frequency of meetings    -0.395  -0.460  0.  316  0.467 
Indicators of forest 
conservation  
        
Involvement in keeping 
firebreaks  
 0.070  0. 930  0.102 0.880 
Involvement in forest protection    0.230  0.883  0.073 0.838 
Involvement in forest 
regeneration 
 0.206  0.756  0.356 0.741 
Economic indicators           
Generate household income    0.218  0.164  0.826  0.757 
Enabling micro-economic 
activities 
 0.315  -0.036  0.784  0.715 
Create employment opportunity    0.450  0.170  0.711  0.736 
Involvement in fuelwood cutting    0.183  0.183  0.633 0.494 
Exploitation of  NTFPs    -0.219  0.044  0.285  0.131 
          
Eigenvalue   5.894  2.116  1.714  9.724 
Variance explained (%)   28.562  18.748  17.514  64.824 
Note: Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Rotation 
converged in five iterations (N=165) and factor loading with a value larger than 
0.50 in absolute terms are bold-faced. 
Most respondents had negative attitudes towards their participation in 
decision-making within the groups, with a high proportion (61%) feeling 
unable to influence decisions during FMG meetings. A further 51% 
expressed poor agreement with decisions made during FMG meetings and 
59% expressed the opinion that they could not make suggestions during   54
meetings. Among members who felt that they could influence the decisions 
made during group meetings, 80% were involved in the executive 
committee. In addition, 73% of the members who felt that they could make 
suggestions during group meetings were executive members and 59% of the 
executive committee members said that they could express their opinions in 
group meetings. These findings show that the decision-making process 
within the FMGs is the prerogative of a few powerful individuals, who are 
generally the more educated people in the village (information obtained 
from group discussions including the FMG leaders and locally elected 
councillors). The frequency of meetings was negatively loaded, implying 
that the meetings are not held frequently; a common feature of social and 
political interactions in rural Burkina Faso, where a large proportion of the 
population is excluded from the decision-making process. Approximately 
81% of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the fairness of decisions 
relating to the allocation of benefits from forest product exploitation (the 
management fund and the village investment fund, both obtained from 
selling fuelwood). 
The most influential variables for the second factor, which explained 
18.75% of the variation, were involvement in forest regeneration, and the 
protection and maintenance of forests through reporting illegal activities 
within the FMUs to the local State Forestry Service (which may result in a 
fine). Since these variables imply motivation to preserve and conserve the 
forest, factor 2 was designated participation in forest conservation. The level 
of participation in forest conservation was generally high; 68%, 65%, and 
51% of the respondents stated that they participated in maintaining 
firebreaks, forest protection and regeneration, respectively. Among the forest 
conservation activities, only participation in firebreak maintenance was 
remunerated because this activity entails significant physical effort, so 
rewarding such activity could be an incentive for members to participate.  
The third factor, explaining 17.51% of the variation, captured four 
participation indicators related to generating household income, enabling 
micro-economic activities, creating employment opportunities and 
benefiting from fuelwood cutting. Since these indicators are related to 
respondents’ household dependence on forest resources for generating 
income, factor 3 was designated economic benefit for the members. The 
majority of the respondents benefited economically (received direct benefits) 
from participating in the forest management program, but to varying 
extents. For instance, 25%, 13%, 41% and 22% of the respondents regarded   55
their benefit from fuelwood cutting as minimal, fair, average and high, 
respectively. With respect to generation of household income, 3%, 24%, 
41% and 33% of the respondents expressed the benefits as none, few, fairly 
large and large, respectively. The extent of participation was dependent on 
the socio-economic and demographic attributes of the households, as well as 
the technical support and the forest policy. Socio-economic and 
demographic attributes accounted for 16.2%, 40.5%, and 1.1% of the 
variation in participation in decision-making, forest conservation and 
economic benefits, respectively 
Gender, household size, income source, land tenure status and technical 
assistance appeared to influence members’ participation in the program 
(Table 7). The respondents’ household size had a positive effect on 
participation in decision-making (Factor 1), indicating that heads of large 
households were more willing to participate in forest management decision-
making than other respondents. The heads of such households have a strong 
motivation to be involved in decisions related to forest management 
(reflected in attending meetings, agreement on decisions made in meetings 
and the ability to influence decisions in meetings), since they are also usually 
rich and powerful and thus may play a significant role in the decision-
making process. A highly significant relationship between gender and 
participation in forest conservation (Factor 2) was found, but only a slightly 
significant relationship between gender and economic benefit (Factor 3). 
Male and female respondents experience different situations, which 
influence their participation in forest management activities, such as 
reforestation, firebreak maintenance, attending meetings, and involvement 
in meetings. Indeed, women’s social and household obligations combined 
with socio-cultural norms and values in the Nuni ethnic group often hinder 
their participation in the forest management program. Women are also felt 
to be insufficiently physically strong for the hard work of cutting fuelwood 
(the main source of revenue for the forest management program), although 
in some FMUs in southern Burkina Faso women are substantially involved 
in fuelwood cutting despite having less access to the fuelwood market than 
men.   56
Table 7. Estimated regression standardized beta coefficients (β) of the latent variable equations for participation in forest management 
Description    Factor 1      Factor 2      Factor 3   
Decision making     Forest conservation    Economic benefit 
           
β    t-values    Β t-values    Β t-values 
Constant     -1.047      0.957      -1.758 
Gender    0.103 1.232   0.441***  6.237    0.173*  1.901 
Marital status    -0.042  -0.554   -0.118*  -1.842    0.077  0.866 
Age  category    0.117 1.433   0.059  0.859    -0.046  -0.516 
Household size    0.260***  3.230    -0.032 -0.471    -0.038  -0.434 
Proportion of female/male    -0.041 -0.564   0.047  0.768   0.008  0.095 
Educational level    0.103  1.410   -0.032  -0.513    0.011  0.140 
Residence status    0.061  0.495   0.008  0.080    0.126  0.941 
Land tenure status    0.080  0.639   -0.20*9  -1.969    0.322  **  2.360 
Technical assistance    -0.271***  -3.466   -0.225***  -3.412    -0.061  -0.714 
Adequacy of government policy    0.177**  2. 392    -0.078  -1.251    0.055  0.680 
Adjusted R
2    0.162     0.405     0.011   
Statistically significant estimates are indicated by stars * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05 and *** P < 0.01   57
Marital status of the respondents had a significant positive impact on 
participation in forest conservation (Factor 2). This implies that married 
members were more willing to participate in forest protection and 
conservation, presumably because they could draw on an additional work 
force (their families) than single members shouldering all household 
responsibilities. There was also a significant association between land tenure 
status and participation; individuals who had inherited land were less 
involved in sharing economic benefits accrued from the forest management 
program than farmers who did not own land. This indicates that there is a 
significant positive relationship between economic benefit and participation, 
and that the economic benefits of participation appear to be more attractive 
for non-land owners for whom participation in forest management activities 
could provide a way of diversifying their livelihood. 
Technical assistance from organizations involved in forest management 
and conservation in the region had a significant negative effect on 
participation in forest conservation and decision-making, but not on 
economic participation. This may be interpreted as evidence that in 
southern Burkina Faso technical aid weakens the desire to participate in 
forest management programs, probably because respondents do not believe 
that the training programs related to aspects of forestry such as conservation 
and improving communication between forest stakeholders would enhance 
their managerial capacity and their livelihood. The principal reason for the 
apparent lack of faith in technical assistance could be that while it may be 
necessary for changing attitudes, it is by no means sufficient to change forest 
management practices since improving the flow of information to a 
decision-maker does not necessarily increase his or her capacity to act upon 
it. Furthermore, voluntary organizations often fail to cooperate with each 
other and to coordinate their activities in attempts to address forestry and 
environmental problems. They are, therefore, often drawn into conflicts and 
unable to act efficiently. Forest policies were found to have a significant and 
positive impact on decision-making. In Burkina Faso, the participatory 
forest management policy introduced in 1980, the decentralization process 
initiated in 1992 and the Forestry Act enacted in 1997, all stress the 
importance of the participation of local populations in forest management. 
These policy reforms may to some degree influence members’ participation 
in decision-making processes by both encouraging them to influence 
decisions and enhancing their aptitude for making decisions during 
meetings.   58
5.3  Performance of forest management groups 
The performance of four FMGs in terms of economic benefit, forest 
conservation and decision-making was compared, and the results showed a 
statistically significant difference in the combined dependent variable 
(economic + decision-making + forest conservation indicators) among them 
(F[9, 636] = 5.32, p < 0.0005; Pillai’s Trace = 0.21). When the ranks for each 
performance indicator were considered separately, significant differences 
were observed for economic performance and forest conservation, while 
performance in decision-making did not vary significantly between FMGs 
(Table 8). Inspection of the mean scores for each indicator revealed that 
members of the Sapouy-Biéha FMUs (FMUs 9 and 2-F) reported higher 
levels of perceived economic performance than members of the Korabou 
and Ly FMUs, while the perceived performance in terms of forest 
conservation ranked least in Ly compared to Sapouy-Biéha and Korabou 
(Figure 2). Members of Sapouy-Biéha FMUs benefited well from fuelwood 
sales, and the forest management program enabled them to improve their 
household income and to start up micro-economic activities more than 
members of the Korabou and Ly FMUs (Figure 3).  
The performance scores for forest regeneration and forest protection were 
slightly higher for Sapouy-Biéha FMUs than for the Ly FMU. Although 
perceived differences in decision-making processes were generally non-
significant, further analysis of each indicator of the decision-making process 
revealed significant differences in agreements on decisions during meetings 
(Table 8). The scores for this indicator showed that there is better agreement 
on decisions in the Sapouy-Biéha FMUs than in the Korabou and Ly 
FMUs. As a whole, the score for economic performance was higher than 
those for forest conservation and decision-making.   59
Table 8. Summary of MANOVA output for comparing significant differences in economic, forest 
conservation and decision-making performances among four forest management units in Southern 
Burkina Faso 
Performance indicators    F(3, 212)  P-values* Effect  size 
Economic     13.56 <0.0005  0.161 
Benefit from fuel wood cutting    8.04  <0.0005  0.102 
Exploitation of NTFPs     2.81  0.036  0.038 
Generating household income    20.80  <0.0005  0.227 
Creating employment opportunity    5.43  0.002  0.071 
Enabling micro-economic activities    6.27  <0.0005  0.081 
Forest conservation    4.68  0.003  0.062 
Forest regeneration    5.52  0.001  0.072 
Maintenance of firebreaks     2.99  0.032  0.041 
Forest protection    4.30  0.006  0.057 
Decision-making processes    3.19 0.025 0.043 
Attendance to meetings    2.18  0.092  0.030 
Frequency of meetings    1.16  0.325  0.016 
Suggestion during meetings    3.39  0.019  0.046 
Ability to influence decisions in meetings     1.98  0.118  0.027 
Agreements on decision during meetings    5.82  0.001  0.076 
Fairness (transparency) in benefit allocation    3.16  0.026  0.043 
Forest monitoring & evaluation    Np  Np  Np 
*significant based on Bonferroni adjusted probability level of 0.01. Np = 
computation was not applicable due to similar ranking for this variable in all FMUs.   60
 
Figure 2. Scores (1-4) of overall performance forest management units in terms of economic 
benefit, forest conservation and decision-making processes (mean ± SD). 
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The variation in performance among FMGs is related to access to the 
fuelwood market, which significantly influenced the economic performance 
(r = -0.996; p = 0.004) and the decision-making process (r = -0.986; p = 
0.014). FMUs that are distantly located from the fuelwood market (Korabou 
and Ly) performed less well than those close to the main fuelwood market 
(Sapouy-Biéha). Members of the Sapouy-Biéha FMUs reported higher 
scores for economic performance than those of the Korabou and Ly FMUs, 
particularly for benefits accrued from fuelwood harvest and sales. The 
Sapouy-Biéha FMUs are located close to the main road connecting the 
province with the capital, Ouagadougou, where the demand for fuelwood is 
high. Distances to forests and markets are among common external factors 
that might have enhanced opportunities to increase the scale of fuelwood 
production. The interviewed members perceived that group size does not 
have any influence on the effectiveness of the participatory forest 
management program, but ethnic dissociation was perceived as an essential 
condition for effective performance. 
5.4   Issues and challenges to decentralization of forest 
management 
The decentralization process in Burkina Faso started with a government 
initiative following ratification of the constitution on 2 June 1991. The first 
municipal elections were held in 33 urban areas in 1995, followed by 
elections of new councils in these municipalities in 2000 and the creation of 
16 additional municipalities, resulting in the creation of 49 urban 
municipalities in total. Further decentralization reforms, referred to as Texts 
of Orientation of Decentralization (TOD), were passed on 6 August 1998 
and modified in 2001 and 2003. Proclamation No. 55/2004, relating to the 
General Code of local Communities, was adopted by the National Assembly 
on 21 December 2004. This law officially sanctioned communalization of 
the territory in accordance with the constitution, leading to the 
establishment of 302 rural municipalities/communes in addition to the 
existing 49 urban municipalities and 13 regional councils. The first local 
election was organized in April 2006. 
The current legislative framework of decentralization in Burkina Faso has 
established three levels of elected representatives, known as “collectivités 
territoriales”. At the village level, Village Councils for Development have 
been established to help develop and implement communal plans for   62
development. Each Village Council for Development includes an executive 
committee of 12 members, two of whom are responsible for environmental 
issues, including forestry. At the district level, municipalities or communes 
have been established, each municipality having an executive committee of 
six elected members, including a mayor, two vice mayors and three 
members responsible for special commissions. The executive committee 
focuses on local development, including land management, economic 
development, planning, environmental protection and the management of 
forest resources. At the regional level there is a regional council, including 
an executive committee with six members. The General Code of Territorial 
Communities theoretically grants autonomous power to the territorial and 
administrative entities (communes and regions) for the planning and 
implementation of local development programs. The central State, through 
the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, organizes 
and controls the decentralization process at all levels. The State, acting 
through the Ministry of Environment and Forests and its Forest Service at 
various levels, was the main actor in forest management up until 1980. As 
outlined above, when the participatory forest management program was 
launched in the late 1980s, the local people were organized into 
cooperatives of FMGs, and entered into management agreements with the 
State Forest Service. They mainly implement management plans devised by 
the Forest Service with support from the NGOs and research institutes, and 
benefit from the revenues generated by the program (mainly marketing of 
fuelwood). Thus, the 1993 decentralization law has brought new actors 
(mainly representatives of rural communes) into the forest management 
domain. 
Decentralized forest management is not yet fully exercised in Burkina 
Faso. There are a number of issues and challenges that compromise its 
effective implementation (Table 9). The case study revealed that the most 
important issues related to the resources-base are the lack of clear 
demarcation of the boundaries between forest management units and the 
village farmlands as well as between physical boundaries of the forest 
resources and the administrative limits of the communes. The unclear 
demarcation or the absence of boundaries between the FMUs and the village 
farmlands may lead to the encroachment of farming into the FMUs. 
Furthermore, decentralization aims at transferring resources to the 
municipalities, and the fact that the physical boundaries of the forest 
resources do not coincide with the administrative limits of the communes is 
a major challenge for the implementation of decentralized forest   63
management. The pressure on the existing forest due to clearing for 
agricultural purposes by both local people (migrants) and large-scale 
agricultural investors is perceived to be the most important issues pertaining 
to the resource-base. A major problem associated with agri-business is that 
some investors gain authority to clear large areas of forests and convert them 
into farm lands against the will of the local population through the help of 
politicians. In some cases, the clearing of forests seems to be guided by the 
desire to own lands that they can claim ownership of, rather than any 
immediate wish to use the land for farming. 
With regard to accountability in the current participatory forest 
management program, two major categories of issues can be identified: those 
related to fuelwood marketing and those pertaining to the allocation of 
revenues. In the case of fuelwood marketing, overloading of trucks 
transporting fuelwood by truck drivers in an attempt to secure extra wood 
for their own benefit and bribing tax collectors to avoid paying forest taxes 
are main issues leading to corruption. The second issues related to 
accountability are inappropriate allocation of revenues and lack of auditing 
of the management fund. The management fund (27.3% of the revenue 
from fuelwood marketing) is intended to be used to control bush fires, pay 
for reforestation activities and remunerate the technical staff. This fund is 
rarely re-invested to maintain forest sustainability, and it has never been 
audited, leading to suspicions of nepotism and corruption, which will 
eventually spark conflicts between the Forest Service, forest user groups and 
elected bodies (mayors and councillors). 
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Table 9. Issues and challenges to decentralization of forest management raised by focus group discussion 
participants in decreasing order of degree of importance (1 highly important and 6 least important). 
A)  Resource-base 
 
Issues   EB 
 
TS 
 
GR 
Mismatching between physical boundaries of  
FMUs and administrative boundaries of communes 
1 4 3 
Lack of demarcation of boundaries between 
FMU areas and village farm lands 
2 5 5 
Weak legal protection of the FMUs   5  3  1 
Pressure on the forest due to high immigration   4  2  4 
Pressure on the forest due to expansion of agri-business   3  1  2 
Emphasis on a few forest products (mainly firewood),  
leading to partial benefit-sharing from the forests 
6 6 6 
 
B)  Accountability 
 
Issues   EB 
 
TS 
 
GR 
Issues related to fuelwood marketing 
Overloading trucks with fuelwood 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
Failure to pay taxes  1  2  3 
Communication deficiency among support groups   2  3  2 
Issues related to revenues 
Misuse of revenues  
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Lack of auditing of management funds   2  2  2 
 
C)  Transparency 
 
Issues   EB  TS  GR 
Poor flow of information between members  
of FMUs 
1 
 
1 1 
Lack of subsidiarity  2  3  2 
Infrequency of FMG meetings   3  2  3 
EB: Executive bodies; TS: Technical Support group; GR: Grass-root actors 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
D)  Empowerment 
Issues   EB 
 
TS 
 
GR 
 
Lack of competence at the local level 
Transferring management autonomy to territorial 
communes  
2 
4 
1 
5 
3 
6 
Abuse of power by some authorities   5  6  5 
Limited participation in decision-making processes   3  4  1 
Limited human resources at the local government 
level  
6 3 2 
Financial constraints at the local level   1  2  4 
EB: Executive bodies; TS: Technical Support group; GR: Grass-root actors 
Concerning transparency in the existing forest management program, a 
lack of exchange of information between members of FMGs appeared to be 
a major issue. The local people do not have the same level of accessing 
information due to their illiteracy and the infrequency of meetings. Indeed, 
meetings are so infrequent and ordinary members of the FMGs participate 
less in the rare meetings, so the elites control the decision-making process, 
which in turn might limit the flow of information to ordinary members of 
the FMGs. 
With regard to devolution of power to the local level, the lack of 
competency at the local level, financial constraints and the tradition of elite-
controlled decision-making processes are the most important constraints for 
effective local governance. Thus, the transfer of management autonomy to 
territorial communes appeared to be premature by all discussants. The 
potential fear of power-abuse by some local level authorities when the 
decision-making power is devolved to them appeared to all focus groups as 
an issue of least importance.  
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6  Discussion 
Forest resources are amongst the most vital components of livelihoods and 
development opportunities in rural Africa (Cavendish, 2000). Hence, 
securing access to, and control of, forest resources is crucial for prospects of 
rural poverty reduction (Andersson, 2002; Ribot, 2004 ). Access to forests is 
influenced by, and dependent on, forest governance (Kowero et al., 2003). 
In most francophone West African countries, the traditional forest 
management policy, in effect from the colonial time up until post-
independence, separated rights and users into two distinct categories – 
commercial and subsistence. The Forest Service and the elite were typically 
granted rights to harvest, and market commercially valuable forest products, 
while the poor rural people could access forest products with little or no 
commercial value under a system of usufructuary rights (Ribot, 1999). 
These use rights could be revoked at any time if the Forest Service or 
administrators allocated the forests to commercial users and/or in pursuance 
of implementing forestry regulations. For example, in 1990 the Forestry 
Code in force in Burkina Faso prohibited grazing in the forest, thus limiting 
access to forests for grazing livestock (Study I), despite emerging empirical 
evidence that grazing does not have detrimental effects on either herbaceous 
(Savadogo et al., 2007) or ligneous (Zida, 2007) components of the forest 
ecosystem.  
Traditional rules and regulations also imposed (and continue to impose) 
restrictions on use rights. The designation of sacred forests in some of the 
villages prevents access to forest products in some places. Sacred forests are 
sanctuaries where the community elders are buried, places where sacrifices 
to ancestors are made, and other traditional rituals are performed, and only 
indigenous married men are allowed to enter. According to traditions in 
Burkina Faso, land rights are held by men or kinship groups controlled by 
men, women do not have direct rights over land, and planting trees on   67
rented lands is traditionally prohibited in southern Burkina Faso. Local 
custom also dictates that only those who have family rights to land 
(indigenous people) can plant trees (Study I). This is because planting trees 
on rented land has been perceived as powerful evidence for land claims. 
Consequently, women and migrants are forbidden by custom to plant trees, 
to prevent them from subsequently claiming the land (Fortmann & Bruce, 
1988). Furthermore, according to the customary rules, people have access 
only to woodlands that belong to their own lineages or families. Therefore, 
migrants are not always allowed to harvest valuable products, such as seeds of 
P. biglobosa, because of their socio-economic importance. Such traditional 
customs and norms are still important, since they are believed to take 
precedence, generally, over formal rule-based systems in determining the use 
of common property resources, such as forests (Campbell et al., 2001). 
Hence, the State control of, and customary rights over forests, have 
disenfranchised the poor rural populations of their citizen’s right to benefit 
from equitable distribution of the natural asset (forests). Clearly, the poor 
need these natural assets to diversify their livelihood and to use as a safety-
net during hard times. Security of tenure (including rights of alienation, 
management, and benefits) and access to resources are key issues that policies 
intended to enfranchise the poor to equitable access need to address. Positive 
affirmative actions are required to support vulnerable groups, as access to 
forest resources has been found to relate to the socio-economic and 
demographic attributes of the households (Study I). 
 
During the past three decades, the management of natural forests has 
progressively moved away from the traditional protectionist approach to 
participatory and decentralized forest management in many developing 
countries. This paradigm shift has been propelled by emerging beliefs that 
those who stand to benefit directly from the sustainable management of 
forest resources can best manage the resource (Nelson & Agrawal, 2008), 
and that it is virtually impossible to manage the environment from the 
centre without (i) the active support and participation of local communities, 
and (ii) assuring them of direct benefits from sustainable management of the 
forest resources. Consequently, participatory forest management has been 
pursued as an approach to some form of popular participation in natural 
resources management through various community-based natural resources 
management approaches in many developing countries (Sunderlin et al., 
2008) In some of these countries, the changes in rights and powers to 
manage forests seem to fulfill conditions that should theoretically enable 
improved forest management(Bromley, 1991) , enfranchise local populations 
(Wily, 2001), legitimize local authorities (Brockington, 2007) and have   68
positive livelihood effects (Lund & Treue, 2008) However, a growing body 
of literature indicates that, in most cases, popular participation is reflected 
more in government and donor discourses than in the experience of rural 
communities (Campbell & Shackleton, 2001; Ribot, 2004 ; Tacconi et al., 
2006). This is also the case in Burkina Faso, where popular participation in 
forest management is very limited in reality (Study II). The major tenets of 
popular participation theory are that local people influence the direction and 
execution of the development or management of a natural resource to 
enhance their well-being in terms of income, personal growth, self-reliance 
or other values (Sensu Little, 1994). 
 
However, the current participatory forest management program in 
Burkina Faso gives rural populations little choice about how to manage the 
forest resources, and their participation is relegated to implementing forest 
management plans drawn up by the Forest Service. The decision-making 
process is controlled by the elite and State Forest Service, while members of 
the FMGs have little influence. To date, permits for harvesting and 
marketing forest products (mainly fuelwood) are still under Forest Service 
control, and allocated to powerful urban-based merchants. This arrangement 
has forced the local management groups to sell to the limited number of 
State-designated fuelwood merchants, despite seeking better access to urban 
markets (Delnooz, 1999). Undeniably, the local people have benefited from 
their share of revenue accrued from fuelwood sales, but it is tiny (about 1.65 
Euro per m³ of fuelwood cut). Members’ self-assessments of performance 
provided further evidence that the lack of access to fuelwood markets is a 
major factor influencing the economic performance of the participatory 
forest management program in Burkina Faso (Study III). This confirms 
Agrawal statement according to which socio-economic condition affect 
users’ ability to manage a resource successfully (Agrawal, 2001, Agrawal 
2003). As a whole, popular participation in forest management in the 
country can be best described as passive (sensu Agarwal, 2001) or resource 
participation (Sensu Buttoud, 1999).  
 
Another striking feature of the participatory forest management program 
in Burkina Faso is that the level of participation is not homogenous amongst 
members of the FMGs (Study II). Members with large households are 
more interested in participating in forest management decision-making than 
other respondents, most likely due to their dependence on forest resources 
to diversify household livelihoods, as they may find it difficult to access 
alternative sources of subsistence. Heads of large households are also usually 
rich and powerful and thus may play a significant role in the decision-
making process (Maskey et al., 2006). Gender appears to be important for   69
some aspects of participation in southern Burkina Faso, as reported for most 
developing countries (Hunter & Hatch, 2004). Accordingly, women have 
limited participation in community organizations in southern Burkina Faso 
due to their social and household obligations combined with socio-cultural 
norms and values of the Nuni ethnic group, which often present obstacles to 
participation in the forest management program. In rural Burkina Faso, 
women are responsible for diverse household duties, such as child care, 
fetching water, cooking food and farming. Further, in the study area, 
women are not traditionally allowed to speak in front of men publicly, 
which prevents them from coming forward in participatory efforts, while 
men are considered to be responsible for village development and 
governance. Thus, norms shape divisions of labour between the genders and 
the role of women as care-givers and nurturers often prevents them from 
sparing time from domestic duties to participate in management activities or 
attend meetings (Nuggehalli & Prokopy, 2009). Fear of losing standing in 
the community may also inhibit women from attending meetings related to 
collective action, since these are often held in publicly segregated spaces 
(Agarwal, 2000). Sell (1997) stressed that women cooperate more often in 
all-female groups since they feel more empowered with other low status 
actors than when they are a minority in a mixed–gender group. In contrast, 
men cooperate more in a largely female group because they expect to be 
able to influence group decisions more strongly in such contexts than if 
other actors are equally powerful, as in an all-male group. It is also thought 
that women are not sufficiently physically strong for the hard work of 
cutting fuelwood, although in some FMUs in southern Burkina Faso 
women are substantially involved in fuelwood cutting, despite having less 
access to fuelwood markets than men (Zougouri, 2008). Popular 
participation in forest management in Burkina Faso can, thus, be best 
described as “passive” (Sensu Agrawal, 2001) or “resource” participation 
(Sensu Buttoud, 1999), in which participants are informed of decisions ex 
post facto; or attend meetings and assist in decision-making without 
influencing the decisions. Thus, overall, the move towards participatory 
forest management has done little to establish new rights over forest 
resources for the vast majority of the rural people. 
 
Decentralization is viewed as a promising means of institutionalizing and 
scaling up the popular participation that makes participatory management 
effective. It enhances use and management efficiency and equity while 
reducing conflicts over forest resources (Ribot, 2002b; Ribot, 2009). 
Emerging experiences suggest that decentralized forest management can 
result in effective control of forest utilization, leading to improvements in 
tree growth (Lund & Treue, 2008), ecosystem functions and quality (Carter   70
& Gronow, 2005), resource status (Kumar, 2002; Sauer & Abdallah, 2007), 
and the sustainable management of forest resources by the local people 
(Ribot, 2004). It also contributes to poverty reduction through improving 
access to forest products for consumption and trading (Cavendish, 2000; 
Larson, 2005) and finance for local public services (Lund & Treue, 2008). 
Finally, decentralized forest management is believed to lever good 
governance at the local level if meaningful powers are devolved to 
democratically elected and downwardly accountable decision-making 
entities (Ribot, 2004). Almost all developing countries are undertaking 
decentralization reforms (Ribot, 2004; Hobley, 2007), with varying motives. 
Generally, most donors and governments justify decentralization as a means 
for increasing access, use, management, voicing of claims and concerns 
about natural resources among communities. 
 
In Burkina Faso, decentralization started with a government initiative 
following ratification of the constitution on 2 June 1991, and in 1994 a 
National Commission for Decentralization was established. However, 
despite the general decentralization reform, its implementation in natural 
f o r e s t  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  i n  a n  e a r l y  phase – a common feature in parts of 
Sahelian West Africa where local elections have been held (Ribot, 2002b; 
Ouédraogo, 2003 ). Several issues still need to be resolved to scale-up the 
current participatory forest management programs into a more decentralized 
forest management regime (Study IV). The FMUs are not clearly 
demarcated, and in some cases they fall within several communes and 
villages, which creates difficulties in devolving control of resources to a 
specific local administration and may spark conflict over forest resources. 
Knowledge of the resource-base and clear boundaries in common-pool 
forest management schemes is essential to minimize conflicts over limited 
resources (Larson, 2003; Wily, 2003; Johnson & Nelson, 2004). The 
decentralization reform brings new actors, namely local elected councillors 
into the picture, compared to the participatory forest management program, 
in which the State (through its Forest Service) and the local people are the 
main actors. The new actors have conflicting power interests over decision-
making regarding the management of the forests, making devolution of 
power challenging. In principle, the local structures, such as the FMGs and 
the Village Development Councils, should be the bodies empowered to 
make decisions. Such devolution of decision-making power has a higher 
probability of failure if lower level authorities lack both financial and 
administrative ‘powers and resources’ (Manor, 1999), which is the case today 
in Burkina Faso. The institutional strength of the FMGs is weak, partly due 
to a lack of transparency and accountability, and partly to poor local 
competence. Further, there are already signs of corruption within the   71
existing forest management program, due to the lack of auditing of the 
program’s revenues, and poor information flows among members due to 
infrequent meetings and elite-control of the decision-making process. There 
is also a propensity for central government to maintain its control over the 
forest resources, particularly through the heavy involvement of the Forest 
Service in the affairs of the FMGs, to the extent of deciding matters related 
to the production and marketing of forest products, controlling fuelwood 
marketing through issuing licenses to fuelwood wholesalers, and revoking 
management agreements made with the local people if some perceived 
violations of the agreements occur. These issues need to be redressed in 
order to achieve the benefits that can be accrued from decentralization 
reform. Towards this end, recommendations are given in the Conclusions 
below.   72
7  Concluding comments and 
recommendations 
Rural villages in Burkina Faso are not homogeneous entities that can be 
isolated and identified by a single objective or common interest. The 
investigations of the determinants of access to forests resource revealed that 
access to forests differed among households, thus local management 
institutions need to take these variations into account to ensure that the 
livelihood needs of the poor are met. Further, the findings indicate that 
factors related to decision-making, forest conservation and economic 
benefits are the most important determinants of local people’s participation 
in forest management programs in southern Burkina Faso. Despite the 
decentralization policy in force in the country since 1992, the State Forest 
Service is heavily involved in the decision-making process. This 
considerably limits the active participation of local people in decision-
making. Meaningful transfer of power to locals is crucial for participation, so 
power should be devolved to the locals, particularly direct forest users, not 
only the group committee members as currently the case in the forest 
management unions and groups. To some extent, participation in forest 
management activities is also influenced by gender, household size, land 
tenure status, marital status, and forest legislation and implementation of 
forest laws and regulations. The performance of the participatory forest 
management program was also found to vary among units, depending on 
their proximity to roads and markets (which plays a primary role in the 
economic performance of common pool forest management). Members’ 
perception of the participatory forest management program seem to focus on 
their ability to generate income to support their livelihood, while less 
emphasis is placed on forest conservation. 
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There are disparities between the decentralization policy and practice on 
the ground. Policy has been formulated and acts have been passed, but not 
enforced on the ground, explaining the retention of central government 
power over forest resources. It was found that the devolution of decision-
making power to the local government and people at the local level is not 
yet effective. To enhance the outcome of the participatory forest 
management program in southern Burkina Faso, the following strategies 
could be considered to foster sustainable forest management:  
 
a) Due to the lack of a coherent balance of formal and traditional tenure 
rights governing forest use, more attention should be paid to securing 
user rights and empowering forest users by allowing direct involvement 
of vulnerable and marginalized groups (women and migrants) in forest 
management activities and thus their access to forest products.  
 
b) Women’s participation in the FMUs should be enhanced, either by 
creating women’s groups within the FMUs and delegating them to work 
on forest regeneration, with remuneration, or by establishing women’s 
groups focused on NTFP collection and selling, particularly in Ziro 
province. 
 
c) Existing policies on participatory forest management should be revised 
to improve the hierarchical administrative structure of the FMGs and 
ensure equitable benefit sharing mechanisms.  
 
d) Membership of the management groups, and thus willingness to 
participate, should be reinforced by increasing incentives. For instance, 
forest conservation activities should be improved through allocating part 
of the management fund to the remuneration of actively participating 
members. 
 
e) The economic performance of the FMUs could be enhanced by 
improving the quality/accessibility of the roads and thus the FMUs’ 
access to markets, or allowing free fuelwood markets. Part of the 
management fund could be allocated to the improvement of the quality 
of roads. 
 
f) Re-demarcation of the boundaries of the forest management 
domains/area and their demarcation in each municipality is required to 
avoid conflicts between local governments and local communities.    74
g) Adjustments to the decentralization reforms and revisions of the 
regulations governing the forest management groups are required. This 
could allow the transfer of forest management power to local levels more 
effectively. 
 
h) The studies presented in this thesis focused on the social dimension of 
the participatory forest management groups. To get a complete picture of 
the performance of the program, data on the stocking density, the 
regeneration status of selective cut stands and other factors influencing 
forest recovery are needed. Therefore, an inventory of the forest 
management units should be made and the management plan revised 
accordingly.   75
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Appendix 1. Questionnaire for Study II 
Factors influencing participation in forest management program in Southern 
Burkina Faso  
 
Date:            The  investigator’s  name: 
V i l l a g e :            F o r e s t   M a n a g e m e n t   U n i t :  
 
I. Identification and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
household 
1.1. Household number: 
1.2. Name of the household head: 
1.3. Name of the respondent: 
1.4. Ethnicity of the respondent: 
a) Nuni   b) Mossi c) Wala  d) Dagara   e) Fulani f) Sissala    other  
 
1.5. Gender:   Male I__I      Female I__I 
 
1.6. Age: 
 
1.7. Educational level: 
a) Illiteracy I__I   
b) Primary school I__I  
c) Secondary school I__I 
d) Religious education (Coran) I__I  
e) Adult education I__I   
f) Agricultural training I__I  
 
1.8 What is your residence status? 
Native I__I    Migrant  I__I   87
 
1.9. How does the household own the land (tenure status)? 
a) Inheritance I__I  b) Rent I__I  c) Gift I__I   d) buying I__I  
1.10 How many people live in your household? 
a) Less than 5 people I__I b) 6- 10 I__I 
c) 11- 15 I__I d) 16- 20 I__I e) More than 20 people I__I 
1.11 Sex ratio in the household? 
a) Number of females 
b) Number of males 
1.12. What are your sources of income? 
a) Selling of non-timber forest products I__I       b)  Selling  of  cash  crop 
I__I  
c) Selling of livestock I__I         d) Off-farm labor (salary, handicraft, etc.) 
I__I  
 
1.13. Do you receive any technical assistance from the forest office? 
Yes, always ____   Yes, Partly____    No____  No opinion____ 
 
II. Participation in forest management 
 
2.1. Rank your involvement in forest management activities (1 is least and 4 
is high) 
A c t i v i t i e s                  R a n k s   ( c i r c l e   t h e   a n s w e r )  
I n v o l v e m e n t   i n   k e e p i n g   f i r e b r e a k s      1       2       3       4  
I n v o l v e m e n t   i n   f o r e s t   p r o t e c t i o n       1       2       3       4  
I n v o l v e m e n t   i n   f o r e s t   r e g e n e r a t i o n      1       2       3       4  
 
2.2 Rank your attitudes towards decision-making process (1 bad and 4 very 
good) 
Decision-making  processes           Ranks  (circle  the  answer) 
A g r e e m e n t s   o n   d e c i s i o n   d u r i n g   m e e t i n g s       1     2      3      4  
A t t e n d a n c e   o f   m e e t i n g s               1     2      3      4  
I n v o l v e m e n t   i n   d e c i s i o n   o n   f o r e s t                    
 m o n i t o r i n g   &   e v a l u a t i o n               1     2      3      4  
S u g g e s t i o n   d u r i n g   m e e t i n g s             1     2      3      4  
A b i l i t y   t o   i n f l u e n c e   d e c i s i o n s   d u r i n g   m e e t i n g s     1     2      3      4  
Agreements  with  decision  during  meetings     1    2     3     4 
F a i r n e s s   o f   b e n e f i t   s h a r i n g              1     2      3      4  
F r e q u e n c y   o f   m e e t i n g s                 1     2      3      4    88
2.3 Rank the benefits you get from the forest management activities from 
nothing (1) to large benefit (4). 
B e n e f i t s                 R a n k   ( c i r c l e   t h e   a n s w e r )  
Generate  household  income          1     2     3      4 
C r e a t e   e m p l o y m e n t   o p p o r t u n i t y         1      2      3       4  
Enabling  micro-economic  activities     1     2     3      4 
( e . g .   s t a r t   u p   o f   s m a l l   s h o p s ,                            
o t h e r   b u s i n e s s   o r   o f f - f a r m   a c t i v i t i e s   u s i n g                     
m o n e y   g a i n e d   f r o m   m a n a g e m e n t                           
activities) 
C o l l e c t i o n   o f   c o l l e c t i n g   f u e l w o o d       1      2      3       4  
I n v o l v e m e n t   i n   f u e l w o o d   c u t t i n g       1      2      3       4  
 
2.4 Does government policy (forest law, decentralization, etc.), influence 
your participation in forest management activities? 
Negative influence I__I  no influence I__I  positive influence I__I 
 
2.5 If the government policy has an influence, negative or positive, list them 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
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Appendix 2. Questionnaire for Study III 
Date:            The  investigator’s  name: 
V i l l a g e :            F o r e s t   M a n a g e m e n t   U n i t :  
 
I. Identification of the respondent 
1.1. Household number: 
1.2. Name of the respondent: 
II. Members’ perceptions about collective action 
2.1. What are the problems in your village? (Rank the problems from the 
less important (1) to the most important (4) 
a ) .   D e v e l o p m e n t   i s s u e s   ( l a c k   o f   r o a d s ,                   
h e a l t h ,   u n e m p l o y m e n t ,   e t c . )          1      2      3        4  
b ) .   D r o u g h t                  1      2      3        4  
c ) .   W a t e r   s c a r c i t y              1      2      3        4  
d). Problem related to forest  
(fire, lack of grazing lands,  
s h o r t a g e   o f   f u e l   w o o d ,   e t c . )          1      2      3       4    
e )   O t h e r                  1      2      3       4  
f )   C a n ’ t   s a y           I _ _ I  
2.2. Do you think a large group/cooperative size is able to successfully 
cooperate in collective action than a small one?  
a) Strongly agree I__I   
b) Agree I__I 
c) Somewhat agree I__I   
d) Somewhat disagree I__I  
e) Disagree I__I 
f) Strongly disagree I__I   
g) Can’t say I__I    90
2.3. Do you think ethnic dissociation is better at working together in 
collective action ethnic association? 
a) Strongly agree I__I   
b) Agree I__I 
c) Somewhat agree I__I   
d) Somewhat disagree I__I 
e) Disagree I__I 
f) Strongly disagree I__I 
g) Can’t say I__I 
 
II. Assessment of the cooperative performance  
Rank your perception about the ability of your cooperative to allow the 
following advantages/compensation to his members (rank the answer when 
1 = bad, 2 = satisfactory, 3 = good and 4 = very good.) 
 
Participation Indicators      
 
Ranking 
 
 
 
 
          
Decision-making indicators    1  2  3  4 
Agreements on decision during 
meetings  
 1  2  3  4 
Attendance to meetings     1  2  3  4 
Ability to influence decisions in 
meetings  
 1  2  3  4 
Suggestion during meetings     1  2  3  4 
Fairness and transparency in income 
allocation  
 1  2  3  4 
Involvement in decision on forest 
monitoring & evaluation  
 1  2  3  4 
Frequency of meetings     1  2  3  4 
Indicators of forest conservation     1  2  3  4 
Involvement in keeping firebreaks     1  2  3  4 
Involvement in forest protection    1  2  3  4 
Involvement in forest regeneration    1  2  3  4 
Economic indicators    1  2  3  4 
Generate household income    1  2  3  4 
Enabling micro-economic activities    1  2  3  4 
Create employment opportunity    1  2  3  4 
Involvement in fuelwood cutting     1  2  3  4 
Exploitation of NTFPs    1  2  3  4 
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French summary (résumé) 
Évaluation du Programme de Gestion Participative des Forêts au 
Burkina Faso 
 
Dans de nombreux pays en développement il ya eu un changement de 
paradigme dans les stratégies de conservation et de gestion des forêts, partant 
du contrôle centralisé de l’Etat vers des programmes communautaires, avec 
le double objectif de favoriser la gestion durable des forêts et la réduction de 
la pauvreté. Au Burkina Faso, les réformes politiques différentes ont été 
introduites et des tentatives ont été déployées pour déléguer les droits 
d'utilisation et de gestion des forêts aux communautés locales depuis les 
années 1980. Toutefois, on peut se demander si la participation des 
communautés a conduit à l’amélioration de leurs moyens de subsistance et à 
la bonne gouvernance. Avec l'objectif de fournir une plate-forme pour 
développer des stratégies qui favorisent la gestion durable des forêts, les 
études sur lesquelles cette thèse est basée examinent le programme de gestion 
participative des forêts (GPF) dans le sud du Burkina Faso en termes d'accès 
des populations aux produits forestiers, de participation des membres, leur 
perceptions du programme, et les défis relatifs associés observés dès les 
premières étapes de mise en œuvre de la décentralisation politique. Des 
données quantitatives et qualitatives ont été recueillies par enquêtes auprès 
des ménages, des groupes de discussion et la revue de la littérature. Les 
résultats montrent que les facteurs liés à la prise de décision, la conservation 
des forêts et les avantages économiques sont les plus importants déterminants 
de la participation. En outre, les déterminants de l'accès aux ressources 
forestières diffèrent entre les ménages, par conséquent, les institutions de 
gestion locales doivent tenir compte de ces variations pour s'assurer que les 
besoins de subsistance des pauvres sont satisfaits. Malgré la politique de 
décentralisation en vigueur dans le pays depuis 1992, le Service des Forêts   95
est toujours fortement impliqué dans le processus décisionnel. Cela limite 
considérablement la participation active des populations locales. Les résultats 
montrent également que, dans une certaine mesure, la participation aux 
activités d'aménagement forestier est influencée par le genre, la taille 
démographique du ménage, le statut foncier, l'état matrimonial, ainsi que la 
législation forestière en vigueur et la mise en œuvre des lois et règlements 
forestiers. La performance des groupements de gestion forestière, est 
fonction de leur proximité des routes et de l’accessibilité aux marchés. La 
perception des membres de groupements de gestion forestière semble se 
traduire à travers leur capacité à générer des revenus pour subvenir à leurs 
besoins, tandis que moins d’accent est mis sur la conservation des forêts. 
Pour améliorer les résultats du programme de GPF, les stratégies suivantes 
pourraient être envisagées: la garantie des droits des utilisateurs et 
l'autonomisation des utilisateurs de la forêt par la promotion de la 
participation directe des groupes vulnérables et marginalisés (les femmes et 
les migrants), l'augmentation des mesures incitatives à la participation, et le 
renforcement de la décentralisation après avoir relevé les défis pour 
améliorer la bonne gouvernance et veiller au partage équitable des avantages. 
Mots-clés: Burkina Faso, dépendance vis-à-vis des forêts, ressources 
communes, droits de propriété, genre, action collective, participation, 
responsabilisation, décentralisation 
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